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ABSTRACT 
Since January 2004, southern Thailand has seen a return of the Malay Muslim 
separatist disagreement with the central government. In this new round of resistance, the 
insurgents’ activities are well planned and well organized and have brought about heavy 
damage to property and life as well as created much confusion, making investigation and 
counter operations difficult. This thesis examines the root cause of the insurgency, errors 
made in the countering insurgency in the past, the insurgents’ activities in this new round, 
and the performance of the Thai government in countering the problem. The argument is 
that the existence of “daily deadly incidents” in 2007 indicated that after four years of 
government suppression, the insurgents still had the freedom to maneuver. The 
government has not been successful in providing civil security and protecting the 
population from the insurgents. 
This thesis focuses on the role of the military in creating secure environment and 
control areas by conducting population and resource control. This thesis suggests areas 
for improvements and modifications. By improving population and resource control 
measures, the military will be able to reduce the insurgents’ influence, establish civil 
security, and finally control areas.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The resurgent insurgency in the southern provinces of Thailand has been steadily 
escalating since early 2004. The situation, particularly the highly visible and violent 
activities which caused more than 3,000 deaths by the end of 2007, has come to the 
attention of scholars and political observers. The heavy-handed policies of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005 and 2006) further worsened the situation. With 
the revival of the insurgency, many observers say that the insurgent groups are stronger 
and better organized than in the 1980s. Although not the first of Thailand’s’ political 
upheavals, this one appears to be  the most complex and brutal.  
The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand is unique. To explain it in short, the 
insurgency in southern Thailand was created by three major factors: first, the emergence 
of great power nation states from Europe into Southeast Asia in the early 19th century 
which subsequently changed the balance of power in the region and influenced Thailand 
to change its rule; second, mistakes made by the respective rulers and abusive 
government officials; and third, an existing  separatist group which continues to reach out 
for the independence of Pattani.  
Thailand has faced secessionist movements since it ended the sultanate of Patani 
in 1902.1 The origins of the current violence lie in the historical grievances stemming 
from the lack of understanding about the Muslim way of life by the Thai Buddhist 
governments in Bangkok, resulting in several upheavals in the past. Moreover, the 
nationalist assimilation policies and the Cultural Mandates in the late 1930s, which 
required central norms, dress standards, and usage of the Thai language only, were 
viewed as an attempt to ruin the religion, language, and culture of the ethnic Malay 
Muslim population. Even though the problems of the past were solved, the government 
still had more to understand about the Muslims’ way of life. The insurgency was 
seriously damaged in the late 1980s, but the insurgency leaderships’ cells went 
“underground” and secretly continued their work which has resulted in today’s turmoil.    
                                                 
1 The conventional Malay spelling of the traditional sultanate and its capital city is Patani, while the 
modern Thai province and city is spelled Pattani. 
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Since January 2004, southern Thailand has seen a return of Malay Muslim 
separatist disagreements with the central government. Once again, the insurgents are 
launching their attacks, mostly against government officials and within the premises of 
the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, where a Muslim 
majority resides. The attacks range from arson and bombings to the targeted 
assassinations of law enforcement officials and soldiers. The insurgents also discredit the 
government by using “tricky” methods in order to gain the population’s support, such as 
generated rumors, calumny, and “black” propaganda to create misunderstandings 
between the population and government officials. The insurgents also use religion as a 
tool to break down the relationship between the Buddhists and Muslims in the region. 
The insurgency groups’ members, tracing their origins from relatives of the 
former Sultan of Patani, believe that they not only have lost their status, authority, and 
benefits through the change of the regime, but also believe that the Buddhist government 
poses threats to Islam. While the separatist groups were organized and became active in 
the late 1950s, armed fighting occurred during the 1960s-1980s. There are several armed 
groups, but the salient group which is active and dangerous right now is the BRN-
Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional –Coordinate). In this new round of resistance, the 
insurgents’ activities are well planned and well organized and bring about heavy damage 
to properties and life as well as create much confusion making to investigation and 
counter operations difficult. 
The existence of “daily deadly incidents” in 2007 indicated that after four years of 
government suppression, the insurgents still have freedom to maneuver. Thus, the 
government must re-examine its strategy and eliminate flaws and weaknesses. The Thai 
government needs to apply the appropriate methods to provide a safe and secure 
environment for the lives and property of the people. If the use of force, as a direct 
approach, is not successful, the government should seek an alternative measure, such as 
an indirect approach. Another challenge for the Thai government is how to obtain the 
people’s co-operation while most of the population is heavily coerced by the insurgents.  
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This research will focus on the Thai government’s counter insurgency in its three 
southernmost provinces. The study will examine the root cause of the insurgency, errors 
made in countering the insurgency in the past, the movement and characteristics of the 
insurgents, and the role of the military. The study will also introduce some counter 
insurgency models and case studies such as the “mystic diamond” by Dr. Gordon 
McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Counter Insurgency Military 
Components developed by Col. Eric Wendt, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines in 
Basilan and Sulu Island, the strategic interaction of the direct and indirect approach by 
Arreguin-Toft, and the Malayan State of Emergency. These models and case studies will 
be used as guidance as well as a comparison with the Thai government’s actions in order 
to identify strengths or weaknesses.  
Finally, this research expects to identify areas for improvement and to uncover an 
appropriate methodology for military operations to establish control of the area; protect 
innocent lives and property; reduce violence; establish trust with the Muslim people; 
obtain the people’s cooperation and support, including substantive information; eliminate 
the insurgents’ influence; and destroy the insurgency”s organizations.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history of Patani is one of the significant issues resulting in insurgents 
wanting to separate Pattani from Thailand.2 The present-day provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat and the western part of Songkhla, once were part of an independent sultanate 
of Patani during the 15th – 18th century. In 1786, there was a war between the sultanate of 
Patani and the kingdom of Siam (the former name of Thailand). Patani was defeated 
During the following two hundred years under Thai rule, many problems occurred which, 
for the most part, came from a lack of understanding by Thai rulers toward a people 
dissimilar in culture, linguistics, race, and religion.  
                                                 
2 Patani with one “t” is the Malay spelling; refer to the Malay sultanate of Patani. The modern Thai 
province and city is spelled Pattani. 
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1. Langkasuka Empire  
Archeological evidence shows that Patani is located on the same site as an ancient 
city known in the 7th century as “Lankasuka.” The community was established near the 
Patani River on the east side of the Malay Peninsula. People earned their living by fishing 
and trading agricultural products. In that period, the population followed Hindu and 
Brahman practices.3 In the 9th century, the Buddhist Empire of Srivichai, which was 
centered on Sumatra Island became prosperous and expanded its territory into the Malay 
Peninsula. Therefore, during the 9th – 13th centuries, most of the people in Lankasuka and 
the Malay Peninsula changed their religion to Buddhism. Lankasuka at that time had two 
cities. The first one located on the East coast (which included, present day Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat and the western part of Songkhla) and the second one located on the West 
coast (which included, present day, Kedah and Perlis State of Malaysia). The city in the 
east was full of merchants and goods from China, Jampa (Southern Vietnam), and Java 
(Indonesia) while the city in the west was full of merchants and goods from Persia, 
Arabia, and India.4 Geographically, the location of Lankasuka was a suitable place for 
merchants from the Middle East/India and China/Indonesia to meet and trade their goods.  
In the early 13th century, Siam came under the influence of Khmer (Cambodia), 
which at that time was the throne of King Suriyawaraman II who built Angor Wat.5 By 
the mid 13th century, Siam was able to deter the Khmer and establish Sukhothai as the 
capital city. Sukhothai enjoyed a golden age under King Ramkhamhaeng who created the 
Thai alphabet and gradually improved and organized Thai society, economy, politics, 
culture, religion (Buddhist), and defense. Sukhothai traded goods with China, Japan, 
Java, and other empires. By the 14th century, the Sukhothai Empire was powerful and 
stable in the region.6  
                                                 
3 Surichai Hwankaew, eds., Origin of Southern Fire (Bangkok: Chula Press, 2007), 27.   
4 Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” Senathipat Journal, Bangkok, (January-April 2008), 
23. 
5 Thai heritage, “Thai history pre Sukhotai era,” 
http://www.tv5.co.th/service/mod/heritage/nation/history/hist1.htm (accessed July 7, 2008). 
6 Thai heritage, “Sukhotai Empire,” 
http://www.tv5.co.th/service/mod/heritage/nation/sukhotai/sukhotai.htm (accessed July 8, 2008).  
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2. Sultanate of Patani 
In the 14th century, Islam was brought into the region after the decline of the 
Srivichai Empire. Islam had been introduced gradually to Patani, where subsequently, in 
the 15th century, King Napa of Lankasuka changed his practice from Buddhism to Islam 
when a Muslim doctor from Ache (Indonesia) cured him from a severe disease. He also 
changed his name to Sultan Ishmael Shah and changed the name of Lankasuka to Patani 
Darussalam.7 Patani shared its border with Siam in the North. 
During the 16th – 17th centuries, Patani was in a golden age, not only because of 
prosperity. It was also a center of scholarships in Islam. The relationship between Patani 
and Siam at that time was smooth. Patani recognized itself as a smaller state and accepted 
the power of the bigger state through the giving of “silver and gold flowers” to Sukhothai 
and, subsequently, to Ayudhya (the second capital of Siam) in the 15thcentury, as a 
symbol of its dependent state.8 However, as a dependent state in that period, Patani had 
local autonomy, as did Laos and Khmer, which also were dependent states of Siam. 
In the early 18th century, Ayudhya began to decline. Burma (Myanmar) saw an 
opportunity and attacked Siam. Finally, Ayudhya was defeated. But only seven months 
later, Phraya Vachiraprakarn (later King Taksin) gathered Thai armed forces and expelled 
Burma’s armed forces from Siam’s territory. However, in the following nine years (1767-
1776), Siam and Burma waged another eight wars although Siam was able to defeat 
Burma every time. While Siam was fighting with Burma, Laos, Khmer and Patani ceased 
sending silver and golden flower to Siam. Therefore, after Siam finished its wars with 
Burma in the west, Siam’s interest turned to the east, toward Laos and Khmer. Both 
empires refused to be dependent states of Siam, so Siam waged war with Laos and 
Khmer for another five years (1777-1781) before conquering them.   
                                                 
7 Koyrin Anwa and Munsoe Salae, Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished (Songkhla, Southern Muslim 
Publish, 2004), 5.  
8 In this region, before an empire wages war on another, they will negotiate first. If another empire 
recognizes that they are weaker and unable to win the war, they will agree to send silver and gold flowers 
including other valuable things such as gems and silk clothes, to the stronger empire every year. If the 
negotiations fail, war will occur. The loser still has to send silver and gold flowers to the winner and 
sometimes the winner takes some population from the losing state back to the winning state as hostages. In 
the case of Patani, there was no war with Sukhothai, but Patani submitted to Siam. During that time, the 
ruler state did not occupy land or directly rule the vassal states, but let the vassal rule themselves. 
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3. War with Siam  
In 1782, King Rama I ascended to the throne and established Bangkok as the 
capital of Siam. Three years later, Burma dispatched the biggest armed force in history 
(nine armies with approximately 150,000 soldiers) to attack Siam.9 Burma split the troops 
and entered Siam through five different channels from north to south. With carefully 
maneuvered troops against Burma’s attack, Siam was successful in counter-attack in 
every area. At the southern border, at the beginning of the conflict, Burma was able to 
hold Nakhon Si Thammarat and Songkhla. King Rama I decided to send the Crown 
Prince’s armies to fight back. Siam also asked Patani to send some troops to help Siam 
fight Burma, but Patani refused. Finally, the armies of the Crown Prince defeated the 
Burmese troops.  
By Patani refusing to cooperate with Siam, it showed that Patani did not accept 
Siam’s power as in the past. So, Siam asked Patani again whether Patani wanted to 
resume its prior relationship with Siam or not, which meant, to continue sending silver 
and gold flowers to Siam. Unlike Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah, Patani 
remained unwilling. At that time, Siam chose to wage war with Patani. 
In 1786, Patani was unable to protect its empire and lost the war. Siam took 
approximately 4,000 people to Bangkok as hostages, assigned Tengku Lamidin as the 
new Sultan of Patani, and left the city ruined. At this stage, Patani still had local 
autonomy, but needed to send silver and golden flower to Siam once every three years. 10 
However, anger and hatred took root in the minds of Patani’s people. Three years later, 
Tengku Lamidin rebelled. He sent a secret message to King Ya Long of Annam 
(Vietnam) which asked Vietnam to attack Siam from the east while Patani was to attack 
from the south. Unluckily, King Ya Long told Siam of the secret message. War between 
Siam and Patani occurred again, lasting for three years, and ending with the total defeat 
 
 
                                                 
9 Thai history, “King Rama I,” http://www.search-thais.com/thaihis/warrama1.htm (accessed July 15, 
2008). 
10 Koyrin and Munsoe, Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished, 9.  
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of Patani. Siam assigned Dato Pangarun as Sultan and also assigned Phra Jana from 
Songkhla as state governor. Phra Jana was the first Buddhist governor of Patani 
designated by Siam to balance power in Patani.11  
4. The End of Patani 
Conflict between the noblemen of Patani and Siam occurred frequently, especially 
over regulations and practices of the Royal Malaya culture which were quite different 
from Siam’s culture. Patani maintained resentment for another twenty years until 1808 
when Datoe Pangarun rebelled.  Bangkok had to suppress the uprising. This turmoil made 
King Rama II decide to divide Patani into seven small cities with the objective of 
separating and ruling Patani more easily. Siam assigned city governors from local people 
and each city had its own autonomy. However, Siam kept sending more Buddhist 
officials who had little knowledge about Islam, the culture, and local language.12 This 
caused more discontent among the people in Patani.  
Siam’s goal was to undermine Patani’s strength by dividing it into seven cities. 
This not only lessened the armed forces but also decreased unity and economic stability. 
Patani and the other six cities needed time to organize to carry out another resistance. At 
that point, repeated war between Siam and Patani caused more intervention by Siam in 
Pattani’s politics, military, ecomomy and society.  
                                                 
11Koyrin and Munsoe, 10. 
12 Local language of Patani is Malay which uses Arabic alphabet in writing; known as “Yawi.” 
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Figure 1.   Map of Siam in 1860 13 
 
In 1824, there was a conflict between Britain and Burma. Burma sent troops into 
Indian territory where British colonies had existed since 1818. Britain had limited 
knowledge about Burma’s terrain. In order to compensate for this disadvantage, Britain 
induced Siam to cooperate in fighting Burma. King Rama III agreed and sent Siamese 
troops to join the British which overran many cities along the coast of southern Burma. In 
1826, Siam and Britain signed an agreement of friendship. Britain also offered southern 
Burma to Siam in order to trade with Perlis and Kedah, but Siam did not agree.14 
 
                                                 
13 Source: Historical Maps of Asia, 
http://cartweb.geography.ua.edu:9001/StyleServer/calcrgn?cat=Asia&item=/Asia1860f.sid&wid=500&hei
=400&props=item(Name,Description),cat(Name,Description)&style=simple/view-dhtml.xsl  (accessed 
July 8, 2008).  
14 Thai history, “King Rama III,” http://www.search-thais.com/thaihis/warrama3.htm  (accessed July 
20, 2008). 
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The emergence of great power nation states from the west such as Britain, France 
and the Netherlands into Southeast Asia in the 19th century dramatically changed the 
balance of power in the region. Each nation state in Southeast Asia had to defend its 
homeland from colonization. France occupied Annam (Vietnam) in 1862. Under 
coercion, Siam yielded to France in a gesture of dependency; as did Cambodia in 1863 
and Laos in 1897.15 These events caused King Rama V to improve upon Siam’s 
governance in order to be more centralized and to counter western colonization.  
The change in the governing system had tremendous effects on Patani and the 
other dependent states in the south. In 1896, the Ministry of Interior had been established. 
Funds from taxation that used to belong to each city had to be sent to the central 
administration. According to the changes, Patani and the other six cities were to be under 
the Nakhon Si Thammarat Circle. Tengku Abdul Kadir Kumarudin, Sultan of Patani did 
not agree with the new system because he believed it would ruin the customs and culture 
of Islam. He sent a request to Bangkok to call off this change and pointed out problems 
that would occur, but Bangkok declined. In 1902, he sent a letter to the Regent of Britain 
in Malaya which brought about negotiation between Siam and Britain, but still he was not 
successful. Later that year, Tengku Abdul Kadir was charged with rebellion. He was 
arrested and put in jail for two years. In 1906, Siam dissolved the Sultanate of Patani and 
ended more than 600 years of history of that great empire. 
5. Consolidation of Siam’s Rule 
Siam was not only under pressure from France to force Siam to cede dependent 
states in the east – Laos and Cambodia but also in the south, the pressure from Britain 
was increasing. Britain was requesting Siam to draw a clear borderline with British 
Malaya. Ultimately, in 1909, an Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed by which Siam was 
forced to give Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terenggannu to Britain in return for a loan 
(from Britain) to build a railroad to the Malaya frontier and to have authority granted to 
                                                 
15 Roeder G Philip, Where nation-states come from: institutional change in the age of nationalism 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 362. 
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Siam’s court.16 Siam was then recognized as a modern nation state with a rigid territory. 
Britain and France viewed Siam as a convenient buffer state for their rivalry in this 
region.17 The 1909 treaty definitely reformed the regime of the Sultanate of Patani into 
the “Pattani Circle,” composed of four towns, Pattani, Yala, Sai Buri and Nara.  
After 1909, there was resistance in Pattani, mainly from two groups: first, a group 
of former Rajas who were discontented by the changing of the regime which affected 
their status, power and income from taxation; second, a group of religious leaders, who 
were annoyed by Siam’s rules and law, and viewed them as a threat to Islam and Malay-
Muslim identities. 18 Many problems still existed in the area especially with taxation, the 
court system and the new educational system. Finally, in 1921, rioting occurred at 
Namsai village, Mayo district, Pattani, where people refused to pay taxes and also fought 
against the Compulsory Primary Education Act which required Muslim children in the 
south to study the Thai language. The Act created dissatisfaction among religious leaders 
and Muslim dignitaries who perceived it as not only as an attack against the Malay-
Muslim language, culture and religion, but also against the status of Toh Guru (religious 
teachers). Massive protests by villagers occurred; many were arrested including Ahwae 
Sador, the leader of the protest.19  The Siamese authority believed that the former sultan, 
Tengku Abdul Kadir, who was exiled in Malaya, was a master-mind and supporter of this 
upheaval.20 This incident caused King Rama VI to amend rules and use a more gentle 
approach in the south. Any regulations that intimidated Islam were prohibited or adjusted. 
There was to be reasonable taxation, and the selection of efficient local authorities. 
Resistance during the next decades was reduced.  
                                                 
16 Before that time if British broke laws in Siam, he would be investigated in British court not Siamese 
court. After the 1909 treaty, any people who broke laws in Siam must go to Siamese court. 
17 Max L. Gross, A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC,. 
National Defense Intelligence College, March 2007), 62. 
18 Rajas are known as Sultans. 
19 Koyrin and Munsoe, Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished, 32. 
20 Surichai, eds., Origin of Southern Fire, 38. 
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Figure 2.   Southern Thailand Border 21 
 
6. Nationalist Assimilation Policies 
In 1932, a bloodless revolution led Siam to a constitutional monarchy. The old 
bureaucracy was disbanded. Pattani Circle was transformed into four provinces: Pattani, 
Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. In 1937, Abdul Yhalal Nasare was elected as the 
representative of Pattani.22 Tension at the southern border returned again when Colonel 
Plaek Phibunsongkhram became the third Prime Minister in 1938. Colonel 
Phibunsongkhram (later Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram) focused on the improvement 
of culture, social, economic and patriotic issues. There were twelve issues of “Cultural 
Mandates” throughout his rule. In society and culture, Phibunsongkhram’s attempt was to 
                                                 
21 Source: World Atlas, Map of Southeast Asia, 
http://encarta.msn.com/map_701516664/southeast_asia.html (accessed July 9, 2008). 
22 Abdul Yhalal Nasare (a.k.a.: Adun Na Sai Buri) is son of former Sultan of Sai Buri, the authority 
believed that he has idea of seceding and cooperated with Tengku Mhamood Muhyideen (son of Tengku 
Abdul Kadir – the last Sultan of Patani). 
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change the ancient Siamese culture so that it could adapt well to the modern era and 
increase contacts with foreigners. He changed Siam’s New Year’s Day from April 1 to 
January 1. Men and women had to dress “properly” as indicated in the Mandates – 
loincloths were prohibited and a hat was compulsory. In addition, betel nuts were not 
allowed to be eaten in public. Regarding the economy, Phibunsongkhram urged people to 
buy and use commodities made in the country. In promoting patriotism, he changed the 
name of the state from “Siam” to “Thailand” in 1939, composed a national anthem, and 
specified the duties and rights of the Thai people. Thai citizens had to learn to read and 
write the Thai language correctly. The norms of the Thai culture were forced on every 
part of the country in order to develop a mono-ethnic character for the state, regardless of 
different cultures and customs of the people at the southern border.23 
Undoubtedly, the Cultural Mandates affected Muslim feelings in the south, 
especially issue #9 - Language, Thai books and good citizens and issue #10 - Dress code 
for Thai people.  Problems occurred when Muslim men and women were not allowed to 
wear traditional Muslim-Malay dress in public. The Malay and Arabic languages were 
forbidden. The authorities arrested and fined people who disobeyed the Cultural 
Mandates. Displeasure and tension increased when the government promulgated civil and 
commercial codes in the areas of marriage, family, and inheritance to be used instead of 
Islamic law which was had been used in the four southern provinces. Muslim people in 
the area were unable to accept the civil and commercial codes. According to Islam, they 
needed Muslim judges and an Islamic court. Thus, the people had to cross the border into 
Malaya’s state of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terenggannu in order to meet an Islamic 
court.24 These changes by the government showed the Thai government unable to 
comprehend Muslim culture which, once more, brought about grievances for Muslim 
people. The nationalist assimilation policies of Phibunsongkhram not only critically 
affected the culture and religion of the southern Muslims, but also provoked the 
emergence of a resistance movement for freedom and the rights of Pattani’s citizens.  
                                                 
23 Surichai, eds., Origin of Southern Fire, 113. 
24 Ibid., 114 -115. 
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7. World War II 
On August 8, 1941, the same day that Pearl Harbor was attacked, Japanese troops 
also invaded Thailand at Samut Prakarn province (near Bangkok) and in the south at 
Prachuabkirikhan, Chumpon, Songkhla and Pattani. At that time, the Thai Armed Forces 
were small and unable to wage war with Japan. Even though Thailand had decided to join 
Britain and the United States, both countries were busy and help would have been too 
late; Thailand would have been crushed by the Japanese invasion before help arrived. 
Ultimately, Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram yielded to pressure to ally with Japan. 
However, many Thai people did not agree with his decision and formed an underground 
resistance known as “Free Thai” to fight against the Japanese, led by Pridi Phanomyong. 
Free Thai cooperated with the United State’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and 
British Forces 136. Free Thai’s members conducted training of guerrilla forces, 
intelligence gathering, and made secret contact with the allied forces.25  
In Malaya, Tengku Mhamood Mahyiddin son of the last sultan of Patani, Tengku 
Abdul Kadir,  who had been sent into exile by the Thai government, played a big role in 
countering the Japanese occupation. He recruited Malay volunteers for British Force 136 
to fight the Japanese. Most of his activity took place in the Pattani region.26 Mahyiddin 
also received support from Phanomyong, the leader of Free Thai, in his fight. 
Phanomyong also hinted that “an Allied victory would bring independence to Patani.”27 
However, Mahyiddin’s hope seem to be unfounded when the Japan successfully occupied 
Malaya in February 1942, and restored the territories of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and 
Perlis to Thailand.28 
In Pattani, during the war, many Muslim people felt deep regret when the Pattani 
provincial governor announced to Muslim leaders and clerics that he wanted Muslim 
people to pay respect to Buddha’s images in schools. He stated that Buddhism was the 
                                                 
25 James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1995), 419. 
26 Gross, A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia, 64.   
27 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” Asia Report No.98, (18 
May 2005), 4. 
28 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 4. 
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national religion of Thailand. Every Thai person was to pay respect to Buddha’s images 
even if they were not Buddhist.29 Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri, 
representative of Pattani, objected to the Thai government, mentioning that the Pattani 
provincial governor was overdoing the cultural mandates and hurting Muslims, and 
attempting to erase Islam from Thailand. Yet, in April, 1944, the government replied that 
“the Ministry of Interior has investigated this issue and found that the act of the Pattani 
provincial governor was correct and didn’t bring any trouble or complication to the 
people.”30 Abdul Yhalal Nasare was very upset with the government’s reply. He finally 
emigrated to Malaya. During that time, confidence in the government greatly decreased. 
In July 1944, Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram resigned. The conflict between the 
Pattani people and the Thai government was temporarily reduced because the new 
government took a more conciliatory approach to governing the southern provinces.  
On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally subsequent to the attacks 
by atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After the war, Thailand, which had 
changed to the allies’ side during the war, returned Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and 
Perlis to British Malaya. At this point, Mahyiddin saw a political opportunity for 
independence of Pattani. He sent a request to Britain, asking for help to liberate Pattani 
from Thai rule, or else for an affiliation with the Malay Federation.31 However, this was a 
difficult and critical issue for Britain when considering the status of Pattani as a reward to 
Mahyiddin and the Muslim people who helped the British during the war and also as a 
means of “punishing” Thailand for its stance in the war. In this case, Britain had the 
power to grant Mahyiddin’s request, but Britain had many things to consider: Thailand’s 





                                                 
29 Surichai, eds., Origin of Southern Fire, 80.   
30 Ibid., 8. 
31 Gross, A Muslim archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia, 64. 
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friendly acts and favorable support from the U.S. to Thailand, and also the Anglo-
Siamese treaty of 1909.32 Ultimately, when Britain gave no answer to Mahyiddins, his 
hopes fell. 
8. Cultural Integrations and Pattani Resistance 
During this time, the government’s concept of building up a pattern of Thai 
identity by ignoring dissimilarities of local norms, cultures, and religions created a 
negative impact. The policy caused many Muslims to emigrate to Malaya. It also 
provoked Malay-Muslim nationalism, and a demand for both autonomy and a separation 
of Pattani from Thailand. The resistance movement divided into two branches. The first 
branch, the political movement, requested the world community to take action to change 
the territory and give liberty to Pattani or allow it to affiliate with British Malaya. This 
effort was led by Mahyiddin. The second branch was the local resistance movement led 
by Haji Sulong Tohmeena, a Mecca educated Islamic school teacher, who objected to the 
Buddhist judge system and wanted Muslim legal autonomy.33 
The request from Pattani for autonomy did not get enough support from the world 
community, and Britain was unable to push forward any amendment to the territorial 
boundaries because of disagreement by the US.34 However, the problems were sufficient 
for the Thai government to change its policy. In 1946, Phanomyong, the Prime Minister, 
enacted the “Patronage of Islam Act” which integrated Muslim leaders into the state 
structure, headed by a chularajmontri (chief cleric) who was to give advice to the King 
on matters related to Islam. With the Act, a Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs was 
established. Two Islamic judges were appointed by the Ministry of Justice to advise the 
state courts on Islamic marriage and inheritance laws. Yet Thai Buddhist judges retained 
the ultimate authority. This retention of authority was unacceptable to the Muslim people. 
                                                 
32  Anglo-Siamese treaty signed between Siam (Thailand) and Britain; Siam was forced to yield 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to British Malaya. Since then, Siam was considered as a rigid 
territorial nation-state. 
33  Surichai, eds., Origin of Southern Fire, 42-43. 
34 Ibid.  
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In the mid-twentieth century, there was a wave of nationalism in Southeast Asia, 
especially in Indonesia and Malaya. This resulted in fighting for independence from 
western colonization. Since the situation in Pattani had still not improved, Haji Sulong 
Tohmeena, chairman of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council and chairman of the 
“Pattani Ideology Association,” petitioned seven demands to the government in April 
1947. Haji Sulong's seven demands were: 35 
• The appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun, and in particular having 
authority to dismiss, suspend, or replace all government servants -- this 
official was to have been born in one of the four provinces and be elected 
by the people; 
• 80 per cent of government servants in the four provinces were to be 
Muslims; 
• Both Malay and Thai were to be official languages; 
• Malay was to be the medium of instruction in primary schools; 
• Islamic law was to be recognized and enforced in a separate court other 
than a civil court where a kafir (non-believer) had sat as an assessor; 
• All revenue and income derived from the four provinces was to be utilized 
within them; and 
• There was to be the formation of a Muslim Board having full powers to 
direct all Muslim officers under the supreme head of state. 
 
Luang Thamrong Nawaswat, the Prime Minister of Thailand, brought the seven 
demands to the cabinet meeting in mid-July. The seven demands did not mention 
seceding, but emphasized “local autonomy.” Still, the petition was more than the 
government at that time would accept, and the seven demands were rejected. With his 
unsuccessful demands, Haji Sulong made another move. He announced his support of 
Mahyiddin, at that time still in exile in Malaya, to come back and rule Pattani.36 In 
November 1947, there was military coup in Thailand led by Field Marshal 
Phibunsongkhram.   
                                                 
35 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 5. 
36 Koyrin and Munsoe, Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished, 41. 
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In January 1948, Haji Sulong and his party members were arrested. Muslim 
people were very displeased. Villagers protested in the Sai Buri district where Haji 
Sulong was detained. Subsequently, Haji Sulong was moved out of the southern 
provinces for trial, but the protest did not end. Tension was increasing in the three 
southern province of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. On March 3, 1948, GAMPAR 
(Gabungam Melayu Pattani Raya – the Greater Pattani Malayu Association) was 
established at madrasas in Muhammadiyyah, Kota Baru, Kelantan, and Malaya. The 
leader of the group was Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Nik and the deputy leader was Abdul 
Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri – former representative of Pattani. Even though, 
Tengku Mahmood Mahyyiddin did not hold an official post, he was a strong supporter of 
the Muslims movement. The group’s objective was to incorporate Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat and Satun into Malaya. 37 The GAMPAR mobilized the Muslim people in 
southern Thailand to protest against the government. Finally, on April 28, 1948, there 
was a clash between the authorities and villagers at Dusun Nyur village, Cha Nae district, 
Narathiwat. Around four hundred Muslims died and thousands more fled to Malaya.38 
The government declared martial law and deployed troops to control the situation.  
In February 1949, Haji Sulong was sentenced to prison for seven years, but he 
was jailed for only three and a half years. In 1952, he was released, returned to Pattani 
and worked as a teacher in a ponoh (religious school).39 But, in August 1954, he and his 
son, Ahmad Tohmeena, were called to meet the police in Songkhla and disappeared.40  
B. SEPARATIST GROUPS 
As seen from the historical background, there were several important causes that 
created and increased problems in southern Thailand. First, the colonization era in the 
19th century when the emergence of the western super power countries of Britain, France, 
and the Netherlands into the region changed the balance of power in Southeast Asia. In 
order to survive, Siam needed to improve its national bureaucracy to become more 
                                                 
37 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 6.  
38 Koyrin and Munsoe, Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished, 43. 
39 Ponoh is a Patani Malay word. Malay equivalent is pondok. Indonesia word is pondok pesantren. 
40 Koyrin and Munsoe, 45. 
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centralized. This worked well in other regions, but not in the south in Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, because it brought an end to their autonomy. Second, the instability of the 
Thai government in the 20th century caused a change in the governing system from an 
absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The new government changed many of 
the King’s rules and laws. The southern policy administration enacted by King Rama VI 
was ignored. There was also competition among high ranking officers to achieve power 
and many coups occurred. The government changed frequently, along with its policies 
and laws, which caused many subsequent problems.  
Third, the Thai government had little comprehension of Islam, and all legislation 
was from the central Buddhist government. Many rules and laws were based on Buddhist 
law, not Islamic. Government officials who worked in the south were in the majority 
Buddhist, and they did not understand Muslim customs and culture. The government in 
Bangkok did not pay serious attention to petitions from Muslims in the south. Many 
problems remained unresolved. The head of the government usually came from the 
military, sometimes the autocracy, and was hard-handed when dealing with the southern 
problem.  
The disappearance of Haji Sulong and his son created more discontent for 
religious leaders and former rulers of Pattani.    As the grievances of the Muslim people 
in the south were unsuccessfully solved by political means, ultimately, several armed 
groups were formed in order to achieve their goals. 
1. Barisan  Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP) 
Founded in 1959 by Abdul Yhalal Nasare, BNPP (Barisan  Nasional Pemberbasan 
Pattani or Patani National Liberation Front) was the first armed group that rose against 
Thai authority.41 The group’s objective was the independence of Pattani and not 
integration with Malaya. Militants were divided into small groups (about 10-20 men for 
each group) and operated throughout Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat under the command 
                                                 
41 Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri, is son of former sultan of Sai Buri. Today’s Sai Buri 
is a district in Pattani province. Adun Na Sai Buri used to be a representative of Pattani during 1937-1944 
before fled to Malaya. 
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of Deureh Madiyoh, alias Poh Yeh.42 As the strength of the group was definitely weaker 
than that of the authorities, the groups used guerrilla warfare. Recruitment was conducted 
through religious teachers. New members received basic military training in local areas 
and some of them were later sent to Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan for advanced 
training.43 The BNPP also informed Muslim countries in the Middle East about Pattani’s 
story and sent many Muslim youth from southern Thailand to study in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. The group received significant political and financial support from Malaysia’s 
Parti Islam in Kelantan.44  
The BNPP began to lose its strength in 1972 due to heavy suppression by the Thai 
military. Five years later, the leader of the group, Abdul Yhalal Nasare, died. In 1978, 
Parti Islam ceased its financial support. Many members left the BNPP, but the rest 
gathered again under a Central Committee of fifteen, led by Badri Hamdan in Ban 
Panare, Pattani. Under Hamdan’s leadership, more religiously-educated leaders came to 
dominate the BNPP. In 1984, Poh Yeh, the military leader died. The strength of the 
militants also decreased from the peak of around 300 men to about 50.45 The group began 
to shift from armed fighting to political efforts. Ultimately, in 1986, the BNPP changed 
its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP), in order to emphasize its own 
commitment to Islamism. In the 1990s, BNPP ceased its movement for a while, but 
returned again in 2002, after core members met in northern Malaysia. It was believed that 
the BIPP participated in attacking Thai security officials in 2002, but there was no 
compelling evidence of their participation in the 2004 attacks.46 
2. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National Revolutionary Front was 
founded on March 13, 1960 at the Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province. Founding 
                                                 
42 Boonrod Srisombat, eds., Various Views: Terror war in Thailand (Royal Thai Army, Command and 
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43 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 7.  
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members included Abdul Karim bin Hasan, Haji Harun Sulong, Amin Tohmeena, and 
various other prominent ponoh (Islamic school) owners or Toh Guru (teachers).47 The 
founding of the party resulted from anger about an educational reform program of the 
military government – led by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat – forcing ponoh to take on a 
secular curriculum which was viewed as a direct attack on Malay-Muslim culture and 
identity in the region. Thus, the BRN was organizationally rooted in ponoh across the 
south. The aims and objectives of the group were to establish an independent state of 
Patani Darussalam. Its politics were heavily influenced by the pan-Malay Islamic 
socialism of Sukarno’s Indonesia.48 Even though the BRN shared the BNPP’s goals the 
BRN ideas were against the reinstating of the sultanate.  
In October 1968, the party set up a military wing called Angkatan  Bersenjata 
Revolusi Patani (Patani Revolutionary Armed Forces or ABREP) led by Jehku Baku 
(alias Mapiyoh Sadalah). Its strength was around 150 men and it was based in the Budo 
mountain range in Narathiwat. The BRN also had close a relationship with the insurgent 
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which since 1960 had retreated into southern Thai 
territory.49 In 1974, the BRN launched a successful attack against a Kabu police station, 
Raman district, Yala. The militants robbed the officials’ of their weapons and released 
many prisoners. However, the BRN focused more on political organization, especially in 
religious schools, than on guerrilla activities.50 But in 1977, there was a major split in the 
organization caused by internal dissent. Ustaz Karim set up the Council for the Domestic 
Revolutionary Movement (Majlis Gerakan Revolusi Dalam Negeri) which became 
known as the BRN-Congress (armed efforts). “Haji M” set up a coordinating committee 
(Majlis Koordinasi) known as BRN-Coordinate (political and religious efforts). In the 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” 
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1980s, the BRN-Congress’ military wing began to decline. Ustaz Karim ultimately lost 
his leadership by vote to Jehku Peng (alias Poh Tua, alias Rosa Buraso, alias Abdul 
Razak Rahman) in 1984.51 However, Ustaz Karim and his followers later established a 
group known as the BRN-Ulama in Malaysia, which focus on religious activities until his 
death in 1996.   
3. Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
The Pulo (Patani United Liberation Organization) was founded on January 22, 
1968 in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The PULO became the largest and most effective of the 
separatist movements during the 1970s-1980s. Its founding president was Tengku Bira 
Kotanila, alias Kabir Abdul Rahman, alias Adun Na Wangkram, who graduated from 
Aligarh Mualim University, India.52 The PULO’s aims and objectives were the 
establishment of an independent Muslim Malay state to be comprised of the four 
majority-Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun along with several 
majority-Muslim districts of adjacent Songkhla province.  
The PULO occupied the middle ground between the traditionalist BNPP with a 
leadership rooted in the former Pattani aristocracy, and the Islamic socialist BRN, which 
later suffered from severe internal factionalism. Recruitment was conducted in southern 
Thailand and northern Malaysia and focused on Patani Muslims studying in Malaysia and 
the Middle East, and on religious teachers. Bira was an expert publicist and fund-raiser. 
He received large amounts of financial support from the Middle East. During 1975-1984, 
many Muslim youth were sent to Libya, Syria and Palestine for guerrilla warfare 
training.53 The PULO enjoyed rapid growth in its membership in the 1970s and several 
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The Military wing was led by Haji Yuso Pakistan and Haji Sama-ae Tha-nam. Their peak 
of operations was during 1976 to 1982. The PULO began to decline due to broad amnesty 
and the political inclusion policies of the Thai government.54  
In the mid-1980s, PULO had been weakened by financial constraints. There were 
also differences among the leadership over rank, privilege and personality. Subsequently, 
in 1992, Arong Mooreng and Haji Rohman Bazo established a New PULO but did not 
formally break away until 1995. The New PULO was active in the Betong district, Yala 
and some districts of Narathiwat. Their tactics were to launch constant low-level attacks 
and minimize loss of life.55 However, in late 1998, the Thai government with the 
cooperation of Malaysian authorities arrested four senior PULO leaders including Haji 
Rohman Bazo, chief of New PULO, his deputy Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and the 
group’s military chief, Haji Da’oud Tha-nam. Picked up separately was Haji Sama-ae 
Tha-nam, the military chief of “Old PULO.” The loss of these leaders effectively 
disrupted the PULO network in both Thailand and Malaysia. 
4. Gerakan Mujahideen Patani (GMP) 
In the 1980s, the insurgency groups had been heavily suppressed by Thai 
authorities and began to loss their momentum. On 16 September 1985, lead members of 
BNPP/BIPP, BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Ulama, and PULO met together and discussed 
problems such as their operations, logistical support, and group disunity. Ultimately, the 
BBMP (Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani) was formed as a coordinate operation center 
and symbol of their unity. However, it did not work out well. Then, in 1986, the GMP 
(Gerakan Mujahideen Patani), a splinter group from BBMP was founded. The GMP 
conducted its activities in northern Malaysia with emphasis on political efforts. Their 
significant efforts led to the consolidation of various insurgency groups working together 
again under the name “BERSATU” a couple of years later. 
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5. BERSATU 
The BERSATU (The United Front for the Independence of Patani) was founded 
on August 31, 1989 by consensus of the core leaders of BIPP, BRN, GMP, and PULO.56 
The founding members agreed to form an umbrella organization (Payong Organization) 
in order to strengthen their capabilities, operate in the same direction, and facilitate 
receiving international financial support. The BERSATU’s aims and objectives were to 
fight for independence and liberate of Patani, while resisting Thai rules and policies. The 
group called for jihad with armed fighting, and requested support from Muslim 
countries.57 The BERSATU was based in Malaysia; its leader was Dr.Wan Kadir Che 
Man (Dr. Fadeh). However, BERSATU could not command the various groups in 
conducting their operations, but defined policy and provide appropriate direction. The 
groups’ member still carried out their activities freely, but with increased coordination.58  
6. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP) 
The GMIP was founded in 1995 by Cheku Mae Abdul Rahman (alias Cheku Mae 
Kuteh, alias Abbas bin Ahmad) and Nasoreee Saesang (alias Awae Kaelae, Poh Wae, or 
Haji Wae). The group broke away from the older GMP (Gerakan Mujahideen Patani) and 
shared the aspirations of other Muslim Malay separatist groups for an independent 
Islamic state in southern Thailand, while seeking to draw inspiration from the wider 
currents of international jihad. The appearance of GMIP was almost simultaneous with 
the formation of the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia) which was set up by 
Afghan veteran, Zainol Ismael.59 
Nasoree had also trained and fought with Afghan mujahideen in the late 1980s, 
where he met Nik Adili Nik Aziz – son of Parti Islam se Malaysia (PAS) leader Nik 
Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, from the Kelantan state of Malaysia. Nik Adili Nik Aziz joined the 
KMM in 1996. It is possible that these two groups were allied and enjoy mutual support. 
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GMIP representative was present at meetings of the Southeast Asian pan-Islamic jihadist 
co-ordinating group Rabitat ul Mujahideen (RM) convened by Jemmah Islamihya (JI) in 
Malaysia in 1999-2000.60 In the late 1990s, New PULO, BRN, and GMIP claimed 
responsibility for 33 separate attacks from August 1997 to January 1998 resulting in nine 
deaths.61 The GMIP specialized in urban bombing using improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) and raids by small groups of gunmen. Their movements were concealed within 
the crowded population, and they waited for a proper opportunity to launch their attacks. 
7. Other Resistance Groups 
Although the BRN, PULO, BERSATU, and GMIP were the principal resistance 
movements against continuing Thai rule in southern Thailand, a weakness of the 
resistance movement in general caused the emergence of other movements, either as 
break-away movements or as new initiatives in other sectors of Malay-Muslim Thailand. 
Among these were:  
a. Permuda  
Permuda (the youth wing of Patani liberation – Permuda Merdeka Pattani / 
PMP), formed by the BRN-Coordinate in 1992.  Recruitment was conducted through 
ponoh, private schools teaching Islam (PSTI), some secular state schools, and also local 
mosques. The youth were provoked to perform jihad and trained in guerrilla warfare. 
Permuda has conducted some significant operations such as armed robbery and 
assassinations of government officials since 2001.62 
b. PANYOM 
PANYOM (Patani National Youth Movement or Gerakan Permuda 
Kebangsaan  Patani), began their first activity in 1997 by extortion of money in Pattani. 
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In 1998, propaganda and provocation to fight for independence of Patani circulated 
through the internet. They also publicized the struggle of many separatist groups which 
aimed to receive international recognition.63  
c.  Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di Patani 
(PMIPTI) 
The Association of Thai Students in Indonesia (Persatuan Mahasiswa 
Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di Patani / PMIPTI), PMIPTI was founded in 1968 by 
Thais in the three southernmost provinces who graduated from religious schools in 
Indonesia. At the beginning, the group had normal functions such as educational 
coordination and student activities, but later it was infiltrated by BRN-Coordinate which 
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II. THE INSURGENCY AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
Pattani’s resistance continued for generations; beginning with the last sultan of 
Patani, Tengu Abdul Kade Kumarudin in 1902, followed by his son Tengku Mhamood 
Mahyiddin in 1946, a contemporary of Haji Sulong Tohmeena (who died in 1954), and 
Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri (who died 1975). The third generation 
consists of the separatist groups activated in the 1960s and ongoing until the present. 
From the past, we learned that the first two generations of resistance were fought through 
political ways and means, while the last generation added armed fighting. This chapter 
focuses on the third generation’s insurgency activities which can be divided into two 
parts: first, from the 1960s – September 11, 2001 (Pre 9/11), and the second, after 
September 11, 2001 – June 2008 (Post 9/11). Overall, the salient difference in the 
insurgents’ activities between the old - Pre 9/11 and the new - Post 9/11 is their tactics, 
which changed from “classic low-intensity conflict” to “terrorist urban combat.” This 
change in tactics created a more complex situation, more difficult for the government to 
neutralize. 
A. PRE 9/11 INSURGENCY  
Various insurgency groups have become active in southern Thailand since the 
1960s. Even though each group was different in its nature, such as the BNPP formed by 
the relative of a former sultan, the BRN by Toh Guru, the PULO by scholars, and the 
GMIP by Afghan veterans, they shared the same goals – to achieve independence of 
Pattani. These militant separatist groups also have their own agendas and characteristics 
in their activities. For instance, the BRN emphasized political activities rather than armed 
struggle, but the BNPP and PULO were focused more on guerrilla warfare. The BRN and 
BNPP had their networks and links mostly in local areas while the PULO and GMIP had 





1. Personnel and Recruitment 
In personnel and recruitment, as the insurgency groups were quite small at the 
beginning, they needed more members to join their activities. Thus, the history of Patani 
and the coercions of Thai rulers to dissolve Malay Muslim identities were brought up and 
used as substantial reasons for recruiting. Two incidents that furthered the recruitment 
were the Dusun Nyur event in 1948 and the disappearance of both Haji Sulong Tohmeena 
and his son, along with their party, in 1954. The BRN was mainly recruiting and training 
youth from ponoh (madrasas) and private schools teaching Islam (PSTI), while the BNPP 
recruited through religious teachers who selected students and teachers as well as 
villagers in the vicinity of their schools. The PULO focused recruitment on Patani 
Muslims studying in Malaysia and the Middle East, as well as religious teachers in 
southern Thailand. The Mecca office was also used to recruit Thai pilgrims on the hajj.65 
2.  Organization Structure and Logistics  
The structure of each group was simple and similar, a pyramid hierarchy 
formation. In general, it consisted of a president, vice-president and secretary; a military 
affairs leader, a religious affairs leader, a logistics affairs leader and a comptroller. There 
were some slight differences such as the BRN also having an “intelligence affairs” leader 
and a “financial vice-president” while PULO had a “foreign affairs” leader.  Some groups 
took sanctuary (meeting and planning) in northern Malaysia, but did not bring their arms 
with them across the border.66 In military affairs, new members received basic training in 
local areas and some of them were sent to train abroad. In 1985, the BRN, PULO, and 
BNPP, together, sent around 30 militants to train with Mujahidin in Pakistan and another 
40 militants to train in Libya.67 Their financial support was obtained from many sources 
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such as donations from members and from overseas, funding from charity organizations, 
moneys acquired through kidnapping for ransom, and some funds from the extortion of 
local business, rubber and coconut plantation owners, and also from villagers.    
3. Political Activities 
Even though each separatist group wanted Pattani to be independent, there were 
some different ideas about the governing system of independent Pattani. The BNPP 
wanted to revive the sultanate of Patani, but the BRN, who were more socialist, wanted 
an Islamic state, while the PULO were more ethno-nationalist than Islamist.68 In the 
1960s – 1970s, the BRN also maintained a close relationship with the communist parties 
of Malaysia and Thailand. This cooperation alienated some of its more conservative 
supporters in Malaysia and the Middle East. The BRN focused on political organization 
and continued to recruit members from religious schools, while PULO aimed to influence 
local leaders and clerics. However, each group tried to provoke the Muslim population to 
fight against the central government by conducting psychological operations, and 
propaganda to induce the villagers to rebel. The insurgents also looked for an opportunity 
to create turmoil in the area with violent protests which urged the authorities to use an 
excess of force. For instance, in November 1975, the Thai military allegedly murdered 
five Muslim youths in the Bacho district of Narathiwat, but for months the government 
made no attempt to investigate. The PULO used the murders to organize a mass protest. 
There were religious leaders, student groups, and political groups that joined the rally in 
Pattani. On December 14, 1975, a bomb was thrown into a group of demonstrators, 
killing 12 and injuring at least 30. The 12 were buried as syahid (martyrs) the following 
day, setting the stage for calls to jihad.69  
4. Armed Struggle 
The insurgents’ areas of operations were active in all four majority Muslim 
provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and some parts of Songkhla. At its peak, strength 
of the BNPP was estimated at 200-300 men; the BRN at 150-300 men; and the PULO at 
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200-600 men.70 Among these groups, the PULO was the best trained and equipped. 
Weapons were acquired in black-markets in the southern region and included pistols, 
shotguns, automatic rifles (M-16, HK-33, and AK-47), M-79 grenade launchers, and 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Some of these weapons were smuggled from Burma 
and Cambodia. As the insurgency forces were much smaller than the government forces, 
they used guerrilla warfare and avoided direct contact with the authorities. The insurgents 
spilt into small groups of around 10-15 men, carried out their attacks, and ran away. 
Violent actions included ambushes, sabotage, assassinations, bombings and the arson of 
government schools. Most of the targets were police/military and/or government 
buildings. The insurgents also kidnapped for ransom, and extorted local businesses and 
villagers. Most of the armed struggle was conducted in rural areas and rarely in a city. 
The Budo mountain range, which lies across the region, was the perfect place for the 
insurgents to hides, train, and from which to attack government officials.  
5. Government Response 
The late 1960s-1980s, was a time of communist issues in Thailand. In the South, 
there was overwhelming number of government forces which conducted suppression of 
both the Muslim insurgency and of the communists. In addition, from 1948-1960, the 
British and Malaya had also contained a communist insurgency in Malaya and asked 
Thailand to help them seal the border, as it had been reported that Malaya communists 
sought sanctuary in southern Thailand. In this case, armed struggle by the Muslim 
insurgency was at a disadvantage at the beginning because the government was already 
focused on this region. However, guerrilla warfare tactics were able to compensate for 
this unfavorable circumstance, as the insurgents operated in the jungle areas of the Budo 
range which they knew better than the authorities. They used all kinds of booby traps, 
land mines, and ambushes. The conflict was protracted for decades. In 1972-1974, the 
government conducted heavy campaigns which were able to weaken the insurgents’ 
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strength. In May 1975, 77 BNPP members turned themselves in.71 Being heavily 
repressed in the rural areas might have pushed the insurgents to operate in the cities. The 
authorities implicated the BRN in terrorist bombings in Yala and Songkhla in 1979.72  
For almost two decades in dealing with the communist insurgency, the Thai 
government gradually adapted its strategy to cope with insurgents more effectively. From 
lessons learned, military repression solely was not able to quell the insurgency 
movement, and actually pushed more of the population into the arms of the insurgents. 
For instance, if soldiers killed one insurgent, maybe ten relatives of the dead person 
would join the insurgency. Thus, to end the situation it was necessary not to kill the 
insurgents but to stop the killing. At the same time, other measures needed be added such 
as disconnecting the links and supports between the local people and the insurgents, 
changing an armed struggle into peace talks or negotiation by opening an opportunity for 
political inclusion, opening amnesty programs, ending injustice, and creating economic 
development. This new strategy caused hundreds of Communists to give up their armed 
struggle. This doctrine later became known as Prime Minister’s Order 66/2523, better 
known as “The Policy to Win Over the Communists.” This order was under the direction 
of then Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda and the Army Operations Center 
Director Major General Chavalit Yongchaiyudth. Two years later in 1982, Prime 
Minister’s Order 65/2525, also known as the “Plan for the Political Offensive,” was 
announced.  Order Number 66/2523 should be seen as establishing the political offensive 
to be used against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), while 65/2525 provided for 
implementation.73 
Although, the Prime Minister’s Orders 66/2523 and 65/2525 worked well in 
dissolving the Communist problem, they might not have worked as well with regards to 
the southern separatist problem because of the different conditions. Thus, Prime Minister 
Tinsulanonda and Lieutenant General Harn Leenanon, the 4th Army Commander in the 
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South during the period Oct 1981 to Sept 1983, established a new administrative system 
called “Civil-Police-Military Joint Headquarters (CPM 43) to coordinate security 
operations, which up to that time had not been synchronized and, therefore, created 
problems in implementation. 74 One of the most important things that CPM 43 
emphasized was to cease extra-judicial killings and disappearances. The government also 
launched a Policy of Attraction, aimed at drawing off sympathy from separatist groups by 
increasing political participation and lavishing economic development projects on the 
region. Large infrastructure projects, electricity and running water were brought into 
remote areas. Military personnel and government officials helped establish committees at 
the village level to promote economic development and security.75 
Another significant mechanism that reduced violence in the South during that 
time was the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center 
(SBPAC) in 1981. The SBPAC was formed to facilitate correction of major problems in 
the administration, especially poor coordination among agencies, corruption and 
prejudice among officials. Corrupt and abusive behavior on the part of officials had been 
a significant source of grievance since the 1940s.76 The SBPAC was empowered to 
reward, punish or remove officials on the basis of performance. Besides government 
officials, the SBPAC was comprised also of local religious leaders, local community 
leaders, and scholars. There was an emphasis on understanding Malay Muslim culture. 
The center also held regular seminars for Malay Muslim leaders to air their grievances.  
The new approach seemed to work; violence dropped off significantly in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The Government’s strategy of increasing Malay Muslim 
participation in politics also undercut support for armed struggle. Many separatist fighters 
took up amnesty offers and abandoned their fight to participate in development programs. 
There were also other reasons for the decrease of violence in that period which included, 
first, the death of BNPP leader, Tengu Yalal Nasae, in 1977 and the subsequent death of 
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BNPP military chief, Poh Yeh, in 1984; second, a major split in the insurgency 
organization caused by internal dissent in the BRN in 1977, and in the PULO in 1992; 
and third, financial support for the groups dried up. The combination of these reasons 
significantly weakened the armed insurgency movements. 
In the decade of the 1990s, there was no significant insurgency activity such as 
attacks or demonstration. Things seemed quiet. On the other hand, this was a “hibernation 
period” of the insurgents who had been heavily damaged and lost their impetuses after 
twenty years of continuous fighting. However, some separatist groups that ran short of 
funds relied increasingly, again, on extortion and other criminal exploits. Security 
measures, once again, were transferred from the military to the hands of the police. The 
government’s projects, which attempted to improve living conditions and the quality of 
life of the villagers, were able to gain popular support and trust from Muslim people.  
The Thai government and the military were able to maintain peace and control 
over the South for many years up through the late 1990s. Yet, under this quiet and calm 
on the surface, the government knew that the insurgencies till secretly carried on their 
missions, particularly the BRN-Coordinate and the GMIP. The BRN-Coordinate focused 
on consolidating and expanding its network within Islamic schools. It was also believed 
to have begun recruitment of a large youth wing (known as Pemuda – youth in Malay).77  
The GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani), established in 1995 had close relations 
with the KMM (Kampulun Mujahidin Malaya – a terrorist group in Malaysia), and was 
believed to pursue jihad in southern Thailand. The KMM was linked with the JI (Jemaah 
Islamiya – a terrorist group in Indonesia) and the JI linked with Al Qaeda which emerged 
in Southeast Asia in the mid 1990s.78  
B. POST 9/11 INSURGENCY 
For almost twenty years, people in the three southern border provinces lived in 
peace and harmony from 1984 until the early 2000s. However, even though since 1983 
the government had been able to tear down an armed struggle and destroy the insurgency 
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structure,, the insurgencies were not fatally weakened. They lost forces but not ideology. 
Some of the insurgents, especially the leaders, fled to Malaysia or other countries and 
continued their fight from there. Some of them were still in Thailand and lived like 
normal people on one side, but on the other side, they quietly carried on preparation for 
the next round of revolution. During this period of time, the insurgency secretly 
conducted propaganda, aimed at persuading the Muslim community to take action against 
the Thai government. They recruited many young Muslims from ponoh (Islam boarding 
schools) including people from religious associations and villagers. These people were 
trained in guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations. Before the end of their training, 
members were given the ultimate test, such as attacking government officials or robbing 
weapons. The insurgents attempted to establish the biggest forces they could.  Finally, 
when everything was ready, the time came for revolt.  
1. Revival of the Insurgency and the Government Response 
After 9/11, the global community focused its efforts on combating terrorism. 
Thailand and the United States had a positive long-standing relationship. Thus, the Thai 
government expressed the will to cooperate closely with the United States and other 
nations in fighting the global war on terrorism. Thailand’s intelligence agency worked 
closely with the U.S. in sharing information and in tracking Al Qaeda and affiliates 
operatives who passed through Thailand. This enhanced coordination resulted in the 
arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah (terrorist group link to Al Qaeda) leader Riduan Isamuddin, 
also known as Hambali, in August 2003.79 Designated as a major non-NATO ally in 
October 2003 by President Bush, Thailand supported U.S. operations in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq with troops.80 Thailand also authorized the U.S. military to use Utapao airbase in 
Sattahip to establish a logistics hub to support forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East. 
The Thai administration’s decision to dispatch troops to the Middle East and assistance to 
the U.S. in capturing Al Qaeda’s link member, possibly led to the country being targeted 
by jihadists.  
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The 9/11 incident not only provoked the Muslim community around the world, 
but also the small Muslim communities in southern Thailand. Yet, nobody knows for sure 
whether the revival of southern Thailand’s insurgency is connected with the stream of 
global jihad. However, the first signs of a return to violence were the well-coordinated 
attacks on five police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in December 2001 which left 
five officers and one village defense volunteer dead. In 2002, the insurgent-initiated 
activities such as attacks on government officials and stealing weapons continued 
sporadically in the region.  
Another factor that might have fostered the upheaval was that in early 2003, 
Prime Minister Thaksin declared a “War on Drugs” which brought about approximately 
1300-2500 extrajudicial killings in the country.81 As the southern border is a region also 
known for its prevalent drug trade, many extrajudicial killings occurred in the region.  
The issue about the massive human rights abuses resulting from the drug suppression 
activities of the Thai police, created discontent among southern Muslims. In late 2003, 
there were several attacks on police posts wherein many policemen were assassinated. A 
number of government schools except for Islamic schools were also burned. However, 
the Thai government did not have a serious interest in the increased violence.  Instead, 
Prime Minister Thaksin downplayed the incidents as “petty crimes” and mentioned that 
these were the handiwork of the opposition groups in order to discredit his government. 
Thaksin directed local police forces to deal with the situation.  
Approximately around dawn of January 4, 2004, a major incident occurred when 
over 50 militants raided the Royal Thai Army’s 4th Engineering Battalion in Cho Airong 
district, Narathiwat province, killing of four soldiers, and seizing some 400 weapons, 
including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and rocket launchers.82 There were also 
diversionary attacks launched simultaneously such as arson attacks on twenty schools and 
three police posts, and the burning of tires on highways. The operation was well-planned 
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and was completed within twenty minutes.83 The insurgents also felled trees and 
scattered nails on all avenues of approach to the Army post in order to protect the 
insurgents’ withdrawal. 
Prime Minister Thaksin reacted to the attacks by declaring martial law in the three 
provinces and dispatched a large number of troops and law enforcement forces into the 
region in order to arrest the perpetrators.  However, most of the military and police that 
responded did not have a clear idea about the situation in that region. There had been 
questions and debates for months about whether the insurgency had returned to that 
region. Although the government continued to downplay the possibility of a resurgent 
separatist insurgency, it issued 33 arrest warrants including the five senior separatist 
leaders.84  
One indication that the government was not aware of the resurgence of the  
insurgency occurred when Prime Minister Thaksin made a critical executive decision in 
2002 to dismantle the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and 
CPM-43 (43rd joint Civilian-Police-Military Command). The Thaksin administration 
thought at that time that the secessionist struggle was over. Yet these agencies performed 
critical functions necessary to addressing the problems of the south. In fact, the SBPAC 
provided a profound mechanism to promote coordination among government agencies, to 
reduce corruption and to address prejudice against Malay Muslims in the government. 
The SBPAC had an active advisory board of religious and community leaders whose own 
networks often reached down to the village level and served as a useful source of 
intelligence. It also provided opportunities for local leaders to engage with government 
officials on a regular and systematic basis and offered local residents a venue for their 
grievances.85 The dissolution of SBPAC did not cause an outbreak of violence, but it 
certainly weakened the government’s ability to handle the situation in southern Thailand. 
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Thus, unaware of the return of the insurgency, the government was forced to become 
“reactive” instead of being “preemptive,” since it did not have a good grasp on the 
worsening situation. 
2. Krue Se Mosque Incidents 
Three months later, on April 28, 2004, ten small cells of militants congregated 
before dawn in several mosques across Yala, Pattani and Songkhla provinces. After their 
prayers, they launched simultaneous pre-dawn raids on rural check points, police stations 
and army bases. Many of the confrontations took place in or near the mosques. The 
simultaneous attacks across the three provinces showed the existence of effective 
insurgent networks. At Pattani’s historic Krue Se Mosque, two groups of around 30 men 
attacked the security checkpoint near the mosque from opposite directions, killing one 
soldier and one police officer. During the exchange of fire, the assailants ran back 
towards the mosque. This forced the soldiers to blockade the mosque but they failed to 
entice the militants to surrender. The militant leader repeatedly stated through the 
mosque’s loudspeaker that they would fight to their deaths, after which they kept firing 
with assault rifles and M79 grenades from the mosque and killed two more soldiers.  As a 
consequence, Thai troops stormed the mosque and killed all 31 militants. All in all, the 
battle at Krue Se Mosque and the other separate clashes resulted in the killing of 105 
attackers in a single day.86 
This deliberate use of force and indiscriminate targeting of Muslims deeply 
angered the Muslim people. However, there were credible reports that pointed to the fact 
that the “Krue Se incident” was deliberately planned and set up by the insurgents in order 
to create a social movement. The Krue Se Mosque was chosen because it is the symbol of 
the former Patani Empire. In a sense, the death of the militants was considered as 
martyrdom. Even though this incident did not create a lot of protests in the streets, it 
caused a decline in cooperation between villagers and government officials. Many 
relatives of the killed militants accused the soldiers and policemen of mass murder.  
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3. Tak Bai Incidents 
Six months later, another incident occurred on October 25, 2004 at Tak Bai 
district, Narathiwat province. Around 1,500 people gathered in front of a small police 
station. They gathered supposedly to protest the custody of six village defense volunteers 
who gave their government-issued weapons to militants. The protesters claimed that the 
men were innocent and had been detained unjustly. It turned out that many of those who 
protested did not even know anything about the arrests. Through the use of informal 
networks, the protesters were encouraged by their friends, village heads, and imams, to 
join for a host of different reasons.87 An international crisis group described the critical 
moment: 88 
Around 11:00 a.m., some protesters tried to enter the police station but 
retreated when soldiers fired warning shots….Demonstrators continued to 
demand their release and refused to disperse.” and “At around 3:00 p.m., 
some protesters allegedly tried to break through the police barrier. At this 
point, General Phisarn gave the order to forcibly disperse the crowd. Fire 
engines arrived, and about half an hour later, water cannon and tear gas 
were used to disperse the crowd, which prompted some protesters to throw 
rocks, bricks and bottles at the police and soldiers.  Many people ran to the 
river to wash off tear gas. Until then, the security forces seemed to be 
doing their best to control a large and increasingly unruly crowd by 
peaceful means. But five minutes after the water cannon and tear gas was 
used, shooting started. 
 
Although without an order to fire, some soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing 
seven people. The soldiers ordered protesters to lie face down on the ground and tied 
their hands behind their backs. Around 1,300 men were loaded into 28 army trucks and 
taken to the army base in Pattani for questioning. Since the people were piled in the 
trucks like logs of about five to six layers deep, 78 protesters died of suffocation during 
the 150 kilometer journey.89 
Several factors suggest that the protest was organized, and not spontaneous. 
However, this incident ultimately created discontent to majority of the Muslim people. 
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More importantly, it provided the insurgents an adequate master frame to create a social 
movement aimed at pursuing an Islamic revolution for an independent Pattani. The above 
event also further strengthened the insurgency and undermined the government’s 
legitimacy. The Thai government did not realize that the adversaries were using tactics to 
mobilize the people. As a result, the reactive repression applied by the Thai authorities 
caused more dissatisfaction and violations of human rights which further aggravated the 
problem.   
4. Daily Death Incidents 
Since late 2004-2007, there had been “deathly incidents” occurring almost every 
day in the three southern-most provinces. The insurgents used terror tactics to create fear 
and chaos. In this decade, insurgents’ attacks were more violent and brutal than in the 
prior three decades. The insurgents’ targets were not limited to only soldiers or 
policemen, but included children, women, teachers and even Buddhist monks. The 
insurgents used four fundamental kinds of attacks: targeted assassinations, attacks using 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a range of targets, arson, and harassment of 
security forces by small groups of gunmen. Since 2004, assassinations have increased 
from a focus on policemen to include virtually any representatives of the Thai state, 
whether Buddhist or Muslim. A pattern that insurgents usually use to carry out murder is 
“gunmen on motorcycle,” as it provides the fastest and safest way to escape. Teachers in 
government schools also became insurgents’ targets because government schools are 
considered central to the integration of the Malay-Muslim community into the Thai-
Buddhist national mainstream. Subsequently, Buddhist monks were murdered as the 
insurgents wanted to create a rift between Buddhists and Muslims. Violence definitely 
increased; the insurgents used barbarian methods in killing by beheading. In November 
2004, three people were beheaded. 
The IEDs were largely used to target security force patrols (roadside bombs), 
police stations, government offices, railways, and banks, as well as restaurants and bars. 
The IEDs were ignited by mixed methods: remote control, watches, and manual switches. 
They were used across the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and also in 
Songkhla province where many tourists congregated. Bombs create psychological effects, 
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especially “fear.” The insurgents were so evil, they set up “delay bombs” to kill further 
groups of people/medical/authorities who come into the bomb site to help the victims 
(from the first bomb). In some places, they set up three or four rounds of bombs and used 
remote control or manual switches to kill more people.90   
Arson was often carried out by youngsters who were members of militant support 
units. Government schools were favored targets. Since 2004, 224 state schools were 
burned. Arson later expanded to include other government facilities, such as local 
administrative offices, health clinics, electricity offices, telecommunication infrastructure 
and public phone booths. The insurgents also set fire to economic targets such as car 
dealer show-rooms (the same brand name that was used by the authorities), rubber 
factories, and Thai-Chinese business interests. To harass security forces, the insurgents 
usually ambushed road patrols with fire arms and IEDs. Sometimes they blew up 
officials’ vehicles by IED, followed by rifle attacks until the officials were killed and 
then stole their weapons.91 
From statistics collected within four and a half years of unrest (January 2004 – 
June 2008), there were 8,178 incidents, 3,017 deaths, and 4,986 injured.92 In 2007 only, 
there were 2,025 incidents, 867 deaths, and 1,720 injured. It seems as if the number of 
incidents has decreased since September 2007, but the number of deaths did not drop 
much. The average monthly incidents during January 4, 2004 – Oct 31, 2007, were 153 
incidents (5.1 per day), 51 deaths (1.7 per day), and 97 injuries (3.2 per day). Peak 
incidents occurred from during January 1, 2007 to October 31, 2007 with 212 incidents 





                                                 
90 Observations derived from author’s mission assignment in the three southernmost provinces, 2006. 
91 Interview with military officials, Bangkok, June 2008. 
92 Deep South Watch, “Southern Fire: Four and a Half Years,”                             
http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265 (accessed 28 July 2008). 









Figure 4.   Monthly death toll (January 2004 – June 2008) 95 
 
                                                 
94 Source: Deep South Watch, Violence-related Injury Surveillance – March 2008, 
http://medipe2.psu.ac.th/~vis/report/VIS_Report_Mar08.pdf  (accessed August 12, 2008). 
95 Source: Deep South Watch, http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265 
(accessed August 12, 2008). 
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The number of 3,017 deaths from January 2004 – June 2008 were 63% civilian, 
12% military, 10% police, 3% village chief, 8% other government officials, and 4% 
village volunteers. 
  
      
Figure 5.   Death Statistics (January 2004 – June 2008) 96 
5. Mobilizing Population 
In 2005, many incidents indicated that the separatists were building up networks 
and successfully mobilizing the Muslim people to protest against the authorities. In 2006, 
a new pattern of protest emerged, with women leading the actions to demand the release 
of suspects. The tactic has been used when the government reviewed its policy of 
refusing bail for suspects in a conflict-related case. In at least seven cases since 
December 2006, suspects have been freed on bail under the pressure from groups of 
women numbering about 50-300. These protests, almost certainly organized by militants, 
also secured a psychological victory against the government.97 
The groups of women and children also blocked the officials’ access to villages 
and even forced security forces to withdraw. For example, on November 6, 2006, around 
300 women and children, mostly trucked in from outside the area, protested at Ban Bajoh 
school in Yala, accusing the border patrol police stationed there of killing a local man. 
                                                 
96 Source: Deep South Watch, http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265 
(accessed August 12, 2008). 
97 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” Asia Report No.129, 
(March 15, 2007), 10-12. 
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Nails were scattered on the road. After about 200 security personnel failed to control the 
crowd, the authorities agreed to withdraw the 30 border patrol police from the village. 
Intelligence officials believe that an active women’s wing of the separatist movement has 
cells in hundreds of villages and is deployed systematically for these protests.98  
The following are some details about the protests during 2004-2007:99 
 
• October 25, 2004: around 1500 protestors demanded release of detainees 
at Tak Bai district, Narathiwat. 
• August 28, 2005: around 200 protestors (with women and children) 
accused officials of shooting a man to death at Lahal village. 
• September 20, 2005: around 200 protestors (with women and children) 
accused soldiers of shooting a man dead and injuring four at the tea shop 
at Tanyong Limor village. 
• February 9, 2006: 100 protestors demanded the release of detainees at 
Daruliesan village. 
• May 19, 2006: 500 protestors demanded the release of detainees at 
Kujinreupa village. 
• November 6, 2002: around 300 protestors (with women and children) 
accused border patrol police of killing a local man at Ban Bajoh school in 
Yala, and demanded the withdrawal of 30 border patrol police from the 
village. 
• November 20, 2006: 100 protestors (with women and children) demanded 
the withdrawal of border patrol police from Sapong village. 
• November 21, 2006: 200 protestors (with women and children) demanded 
the withdrawal of paramilitaries from Koraemae village. 
• November 22, 2006: 300 protested as a man was shot to death by officials 
at Sa Koe village (extra judicial killing upon arrest). 
• November 22, 2006: 100 protestors (with woman and children) demanded 
the withdrawal of security forces from Bunnag Sata district, Yala. 
• November 23, 2006: 60 protestors were protesting as a man was killed by 
officials at Tharn Toe village (extra judicial killing). 
• January 4, 2007: 150 protestors (with woman and children) demanded the 
release of detainees from Ka Pho district, Pattani. 
• January 26, 2007: 40 protestors (with woman and children) demanded the 
release of detainees in Yala district, Yala. 
 
                                                 
98 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,” Asia Report No.129, 
(March 15, 2007), 10-12. 
99The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence. 
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With this kind of situation, there is a need to exercise the utmost care in handling 
the problems. In addition, this situation seemed to be more complex and posed a high 
risk. The police were frustrated by their inability to respond more effectively to the 
protests. They were afraid that a Tak Bai-like incident might occur again, so they were 
forced to release suspects on bail even if some of them escaped and never returned for 
judicial action. 
6. BRN-Coordinate: The “Seven-Step Plan” Towards the Liberation of 
Patani Darussalam 
On May 1, 2003, Thai authorities searched the house of Masae U-seng, a BRN-
Coordinate’s core member and teacher at Sampan Wittaya School in Narathiwat province 
and found important documents about the structure of the United Front Council (Dewan 
Pimpinan Parti – DPP) and the seven-step plan towards the liberation of Patani 
Darussalam. Military intelligence believed that the president of the United Front Council 
was Sapaeing Basau, former principle of Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province. The 
DPP has two parts: a higher level – policy/administrative and a lower level – local 
practices. The higher level consisted of a president and vice president and foreign affairs 
leader, military affairs leader, youth affairs leader, economic affairs leader, public 
relations affairs leader, and religious affairs leader. The DPP divided the southern border 
area into three zones, each zone with three kinds of forces – city forces, village forces, 
and jungle forces. The authorities believed that BRN-Coordinate was the lead 
organization and controlled all activities, while the GMIP and New PULO supported 
their men and equipment, especially with weapons and explosives. From interrogated 
detained insurgents, it was learned that the insurgency groups convened in late 2003 to 
coordinate their activities such as recruiting more members, weapons training, acquiring 
more equipment and planning to revolt in 2005, according to the seven-step plan towards 
the liberation of Patani Darussalam. But they were not ready and needed to shift the plan 
to revolt in 2007 instead.100  
 
                                                 
100 Interview with military intelligence, Bangkok, June 2008. 
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The plan can be summarized as follows:101 
• Creating public awareness of Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and the 
Patani homeland; the invasion/occupation (by the Thai state); and the 
struggle for independence. 
• Creating mass support through religious teaching at various levels, 
including tadika (Koranic elementary schools), ponoh (Islamic boarding 
schools), private Islamic colleges and through various Islamic 
committees.  
• Setting up secretive organizational structures and the BRN will back up 
and help in the establishment. 
• Recruiting and training of ethnic Malay Muslim youth to become militant, 
aiming to have 300 well-trained, 3,000 trained, and 30,000 ethical 
members. 
• Building nationalism by focusing on ethnic Malay Muslims. Patani’s 
people must be fighters/warriors, including people who are government 
officials or live in Malaysia. 
• Launching attacks by 30,000 youth militants, 3,000 youth commandos, 
and 300 cadre, almost all funded by donations from charity. 
• Setting the stage for revolution by establishing a power within the 
military, the political mass (people), and the economy, in order to achieve 
self-reliance. 
In launching an attack, the insurgents plan to attack government targets in every 
zone as much as they can. They wish for the media to report the news globally. The 
insurgents also want the UN, international government organizations, and NGOs to 
become involved and solve the problem similarly to their actions in East Timor and Ache 
in Indonesia. Finally, the insurgents think that, ultimately, there will be a demand for a 
referendum and that there is a chance for Patani Darussalam to achieve its autonomy or 
separation.102   
7. Almost Losing the War 
In order to counter the insurgency, the government established the Southern 
Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) and National Reconciliation in late 
2004. The SBPPC acts as a joint command & control for inter-government agencies in 
the South, focusing on military operations and southern border region development, 
                                                 
101  Surichai, eds., Origin of Southern Fire, 228-229.    
102 Interview with military intelligence, Bangkok, June 2008. 
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while the National Reconciliation focuses on the peace process. However, the SBPPC has 
faced many obstacles since the beginning, such as the frequent changeover of the 
Director of the Command, frequent changing of the organizational structure, and 
inconsistencies in personnel. When violence increases, there have been discrepancies 
between the SBPPC and the National Reconciliation. Besides, Thaksin’s administration 
always treated the problem in a hard handed way, which caused more discontent in 
Muslim people in the South.  
As people are considered as center of gravity in a war by insurgency, the 
insurgents are not only trying to influence the people with propaganda and coercion, but 
also attempting to create a rift between the Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims in the 
region. It seems that the government did not have any “preemption plan” to deal with this 
kind of problem. The government usually reacts indiscriminately and sometimes with 
low-legitimacy. As violence escalated, the Buddhist church and Buddhist monks became 
targets of the insurgents. Many government schools (Buddhist schools) was burned, 
teachers were assassinated. The insurgents also coerced Buddhist to leave the three 
provinces by killing and vandalizing properties. The insurgents continued killing local 
people who cooperated with the authorities. Many people became fearful and were under 
the insurgents’ influence. A counter-insurgency by means of obtaining valuable 
intelligence from local people seems to be very difficult. Soldiers and police were 
attacked by IEDs ambushes. There were bombs everywhere. The loss of lives and 
properties has increased, yet the government seems to be unable to correct the situation. 
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III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
There are some counterinsurgency models that can be used as principles. Each 
model provides a guide for implementation in a counterinsurgency. The model in this 
chapter has some similarities and some difference in context which have been modified 
to fit the nature of each insurgency. Yet, although insurgencies in many places look alike, 
they are not the same. Each has different backgrounds, grievances, and internal and 
external environmental factors that shape their unique characteristics. Thus, an 
insurgency that occurs in a different place, time, and circumstance may not fit the exact 
models in this chapter. However, this chapter will give a fundamental overview of 
various counterinsurgency models and discuss in later chapters the using each of these 
models for the counterinsurgency in southern Thailand. 
A. THE DIAMOND MODEL 
The Diamond Model was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). The Diamond Model illustrates interactions between a host-
nation government, the insurgents, the local populace, and international actors or 
sponsors. In this concept, people are the center of gravity. The state needs to build 
legitimacy and control over the population to include focus on the people’s needs and 
security. Substantial information derived from the people about the insurgency will 
support the state in targeting the insurgents’ infrastructure, safe havens, and support. 
Ultimately, this model can help planners develop a coherent and holistic counter 
insurgency effort. 
Dr. McCormick also mentioned the consensus-control theory in his course on 
“Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” This theory is an important tool for conquering the 
insurgents. In insurgency warfare, the state and the counter-state need to have a mass 
support base (people) in order to win the war. They are competing to seize the support of 




gain legitimacy are needed. The theory says that the degree of control is dependent on the 
consensus that a group has on the population.103 For example, a high degree of consensus 
by a government on its people translates to a high degree of control. 
 
                              
Figure 6.   Consensus – Control Model 104 
 
The ability of the government to establish control over a population and a territory 
enhances its legitimacy. When a government is perceived as legitimate, it would be very 
difficult for an insurgent group to diminish that legitimacy. On the other hand, an 
insurgent group similarly establishes consensus from a population in order to gain 
support. The insurgents could build master frames by exploiting the grievances of the 
people. In this way, insurgents attempt to sway the support of the people from the 
government to their insurgent group. 
According to McCormick, at the beginning, a counter state or insurgent group is 
usually a small group of people. This lack of forces is their disadvantage. Yet, this 
disadvantage can be compensated for by recruiting new members and sympathy from the 
population. Although the state has advantages of military strength, it has a disadvantage 
in intelligence which blinds the state to the enemy’s movements. The first step (1) of the 
insurgent group is to do everything possible, such as exploiting grievances or using 
                                                 
103 Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, July 2007. 
104 Ibid. 
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coercion, to control and manipulate the population (see Figure 7). If this stage is 
successful, the counter state will gain support (people, guns, and money) which will 
enhance the growth of the counter state.   
 
                           
Figure 7.   Sequence of Counter State 105 
 
The second stage (2) of the insurgent group’s development involves trying to 
bargain with the state’s control, break down connections and relationships between the 
state and the population. This can be accomplished by propaganda or threatening the 
people to not cooperate with the authorities. In the third stage (3), the insurgents use 
violence in operations, which may begin on a small scale such as assassination or 
ambushes, to attack the state’s officials. The insurgents may launch a large attack on the 
government when they are strong enough to do so, or when the government becomes 
weaker.  
Now, in countering, if the government loses the population’s support, it will be 
difficult to win the battle. However, many states or military leaders usually think that 
they must attack the insurgents first (1) to win the war, and focus on the population later 
(see Figure 8). The more the state focuses on finding, following, and finishing the 
insurgents, the more time is lost with a low rate of capture or killing of the insurgents. 
The insurgents are much more difficult to find than an enemy in conventional warfare. 
The government will spend years and years attempting to find the enemy and will 
ultimately fail.  
                                                 
105 Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, July 2007. 
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Figure 8.   Incorrect State Counter 106           
 
With this kind of approach, it is very difficult for the state to succeed. The state 
cannot “see” the counter state and consequently is unable to destroy its forces.  The 
government’s frustration in failing to find the enemy will pose a potential risk to innocent 
people; the state may resort to human rights abuse, torture, the capturing of the wrong 
people and, in the worst case, killing innocent people. These are caused by a lack of 
substantial information needed to identify the insurgent group’s members.   
In insurgency warfare, populations are the key to solving insurgency problems 
because people “see” the insurgents. People are the bridge by which the state can “meet” 
the insurgents. People own information about the insurgents that the government needs. 
Thus, the correct way to deal with an insurgency problem is (1), for the state to focus on 
the population first, and (2), while trying to control the situation and mitigate insurgency 
incidents, the state must sever the links between the population and the counter state. 
When the insurgents become weaker because of losing population support and 
information about the insurgents is known, the state will then be able to (3), attack the 
insurgents and win the war (see Figure 9).   
                                                 
106 Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, July 2007. 
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Figure 9.   Correct State Counter 107  
 
Sometimes, there is external support involved with the counter state which 
definitely strengthens the insurgency. The external support can be from other insurgency 
groups, bandit organizations, rogue states, or international terrorist/insurgency groups. 
Besides, the international community, religious organizations or nations may sympathize 
with the insurgents if the government brutally suppresses the insurgents or carries out 
mass murders without discriminating between the people and the insurgents.  
The state needs to determine if the insurgency has external support or not. If an 
external sponsor is involved, the state should attack the conduits which pour in finance 
and supplies to the insurgents. Meanwhile, the state must build legitimacy in the eyes of 
these international actors or partner nations. If the insurgents received external support 
from a rogue state, the state might attack that rogue state and sever links between the 
insurgents and the rogue state at the same time. Figure 10 illustrates the sequence of a 
state’s operations which can be performed by dealing with international actors first and 
cutting off links later, or cutting off the link first, and dealing with international actors 
later, or doing both at the same time and then attacking the counter state last. 
 
                                                 
107 Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, July 2007. 
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Figure 10.   External Support from International Actors.108 
 
Furthermore, in dealing with international actors, the state needs to implement 
diplomatic operations to gain support from other governments, non-government 
organizations, or international organizations. Collaboration between neighbors, such as 
by sealing borders, will definitely weaken the insurgents.  
Finally, if all figures are connected, the “Diamond Model” will emerge and can be 
used to explain the principle of counterinsurgency. This diagram is relatively easy to 
understand and contains all the key players of insurgency warfare. It obviously can help 
planners develop a logical and holistic counter insurgency effort (see Figure 11). 
 
                                                 
108 Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, July 2007. 
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Figure 11.   The Diamond Model 109 
B. STRATEGIC COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELING 
In 2005, Colonel Eric P. Wendt wrote “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling.” 
110 In his article he mentioned several important factors needed by a counterinsurgency. 
These include the military component forces, accuracy assessment, and proper use of 
national power in its various forms– military, informational, diplomatic, law-
enforcement, intelligence, financial and economic – or MIDLIFE. The combination of 
these factors is a powerful tool to increase consensus and control of the population, 
obtain vital information, sever links between the insurgents and the people, and finally 
enable the state to capture or kill the insurgents. 
1.  COIN Military Components 
The COIN Military Components are based partially on operations during the 
Malayan insurgency (1948-1960). The first component is the constabulary force. The 
                                                 
109 Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, July 2007. 
110 Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, Special Warfare magazine, 
(September 2005), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf  (accessed September 25, 2008). 
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constabulary force needs to live and operate in the local area with the people. Special 
Forces soldiers (SF) are ideal for leading the constabulary force because of their special 
skill in communicating with people, their cultural awareness, their local language 
capabilities, and their light-infantry skills that allow the SF detachments to defend 
themselves for a short period of time. The mission of the constabulary is to stay in the 
local area, get to know the people, observe the people’s movements, develop small 
human intelligence networks, and small SWAT-type teams that can target members of 
the insurgent infrastructure once they have been identified and exposed.  
The constabulary force also conducts population and resource control (PRC) 
measures. The constabulary has to make sure that PRC measures are proportionate to the 
level of insurgent movement in a local area. If an area is heavily influenced by 
insurgents, the constabulary must use rigorous PRC measures such as registration and 
pass systems at checkpoints, and search suspected residences. However, if conducting 
strict measures for a long time will cause negative effects on the population. some 
measures must be lifted when the situation permits. Sometimes, the conventional forces 
are needed to establish local control before and while the constabulary conducts its work 
in an area with the deepest insurgent support. Once the constabulary begins operations, 
all military forces operating in the constabulary’s area of operations should fall under the 




Figure 12.   Wendt’s Three Desired COIN Military Components 111 
 
The second component of COIN is the quick-reaction force (QRF). The QRF 
must be able to aid the constabulary force as soon as possible when it is attacked. The 
QRF may stay near or between villages and keep radio contact with the constabulary 
force 24 hours a day. The QRF should be skilled in offensive urban operations, have high 
mobility and be ready to operate by day or night.  Rangers, Marines, SEALs, and Stryker 
units are ideal QRF elements.  
The movement-to-contact (MTC) force is the final component of the model. 
Wendt explained that:  
Ideally, the MTC force operates along the seams of constabulary AOs and 
along key avenues of enemy external support (country borders, inbound 
flow from sanctuaries, etc.). Its mission is to gain and maintain contact 
with the enemy outside the areas in which the constabularies are working. 
Relentless in nature, the MTC force must move aggressively and 
continuously, forcing the enemy to either engage or move. Host-state or 
U.S. conventional infantry, armor and aviation forces are superb tools for 
the MTC force.112  
                                                 
111 Source: Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, Special Warfare 
magazine, (September 2005), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf  (accessed September 25, 2008), 
7.   
112 Ibid. 
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In counterinsurgency action, once the MTC force engages the insurgents, the 
insurgents might retreat to a place where they can get support. The MTC might pursue 
them along with the constabulary force which keeps watch over an area and will detect 
the insurgents’ force that comes into a village to hide or obtain logistical support. This 
will enable the security force to capture or kill the insurgents. If the insurgent force is too 
robust, the MTC or the constabulary force will call the QRF for assistance. The three 
components must operate in an area until there is no insurgent movement which means 
the area is “under control.” 
Normally, there are many areas which have been under the influence of the 
insurgents. In order to expand the control area, Wendt suggests that the three component 
forces should initiate in one area and then slowly build and expand to geographically 
linked areas rather than to geographically separate areas. However, it is important to 
remember that the QRF and MTC forces are supporting efforts. The constabulary 
element, which specifically targets the infrastructure, must provide the main effort. 
2.  MIDLIFE, Assumptions 
According to Wendt, elements of national power consist of the military, 
informational, diplomatic, law-enforcement, intelligence, financial and economic, or 
MIDLIFE. To conquer the insurgents, these assets must be used as counterinsurgencies in 
both direct and indirect approaches. Following the principle of the “Diamond Model,” the 
planner should consider how to use these assets effectively along with Leg 1 to Leg 5 in 
the Diamond Model. For example, in Leg 1 (actions of the state to the people), the 
planner has to think about what kind of military actions will help increase legitimacy and 
control between the government and the people.  
In informational actions, the planner must consider how the message can reach 
the target audience. As Wendt stated about informational actions: 
How can the message be translated? By radio? By television? Does the 
population have television sets? Is the population literate? Can local 
newspapers be used, or should cartoons be developed that will inform an 





the list of feasible informational actions is developed. Next come 
diplomatic actions, and so on, until the entire analysis of MIDLIFE assets 
for Leg 1 of the diamond is complete.113 
 
In Leg 2, similarly, the planner should consider MIDLIFE elements, one at a time, 
to determine what method or tools can be use to sever links between the insurgents and 
the population and then produce a list of possible actions. The same method should be 
applied to legs 3, 4, and 5 of the Diamond Model. At the end, Wendt explains that: 
The planning is exhaustive, the lists of feasible actions for each element of 
national power are long, and the planning group must not take shortcuts. 
This methodology should be applied for all five legs of the diamond, 
methodically and sequentially, war-gaming every element of MIDLIFE 
against each leg of the diamond….Once MIDLIFE actions of each 
individual diamond leg have been identified, they should be war gamed to 
determine the effects that actions taken in one area will have on other legs 
of the diamond. Once this dynamic phase of war-gaming is complete, we 
will have a list of untailored but feasible actions that address the MIDLIFE 
spectrum.114 
3. Accurate Assessment 
The need for accurate assessment is also found in Col. Wendt’s article “Strategic 
Counterinsurgency Modeling.” In it, he stresses that it is important to know exactly what 
the people need in order to effectively tailor national resources into a specific area. In 
order to know the people’s needs and obtain correct information in an area, the most 
important thing that the government must have are assessment teams. Accurate 
assessment and the correct kind of national asset support will improve the situation and 
finally help the government to control the area. Wendt explains that: 
The best way to tailor resources for local implementation is to conduct a 
census and an assessment of each area identified as an area of active or 
passive insurgent support.  Broad, national-level census and assessments 




                                                 
113 Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, Special Warfare magazine, 
(September 2005), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf  (accessed September 25, 2008), 9. 
114 Ibid., 10. 
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area-specific results can be captured….Intelligence gathering from the 
populace will vary from village to village and neighborhood to 
neighborhood. Therefore, localized assessments are a must.115  
 
Thus, in order to obtain an accurate assessment, assessment teams that operate in 
the local area of assessment are needed. In this case, the SF team working as the 
constabulary force in the village should be an ideal assessment team. In conducting 
assessment in a host state, the assessment team must know well the local language, 
customs, and culture in that area. Additional requirements for the assessment team are 
expertise in different areas: for example, engineers to assess bridges, wells, roads and 
other structures; doctors to assess medical needs ranging from dentistry and veterinary 
medicine, to food storage and hygiene. 
Another necessary element in conducting assessment is an assessment tool. 
Planners have to develop an assessment tool that will provide the “ground truth,” which 
is needed to apply feasible MIDLIFE actions. Wendt explains that: 
To develop the assessment tool, planners start with the list of untailored 
but feasible MIDLIFE actions. Then, for each feasible action, they 
develop a list of questions and further indicators that will show the best 
way of locally tailoring and applying local MIDLIFE-resource carrots and 
sticks.”116 Wendt also said that “When the assessment tool is complete, it 
is distributed to the assessment teams throughout the entire insurgent area. 
Each team will answer the questions in detail and return the assessment. 
Consolidating and tabulating the data from the teams produces a matrix 
that compares assessed areas throughout the insurgent battlespace.117 
 
Information derived from an assessment team by this method is essential and able 
to provide the ground truth. If the government fails to obtain and use ground truth, the 
misapplication of resources will result. The assessment should not be conducted only one 
time, but periodically, which allows the officials to observe and act on any changes.  
                                                 
115 Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, Special Warfare magazine, 
(September 2005), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf  (accessed September 25, 2008), 10.   
116 Ibid., 11.  
117 Ibid. 
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C. OEF – PHILIPPINES  
Operations Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) is found in Colonel Gregory 
Wilson’s article “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The 
Indirect Approach.”118 The OEF-P was a successful operation against Abu Sayyaf on 
Basilan Island in 2002, led by Brigadier General Donald Wurster and Colonel David 
Fridovich. The OEF-P planners created their guiding strategy using principles from the 
Diamond Model of Dr. Gordon McCormick. The OEF-P focused on three interconnected 
lines of operation: building Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) capacity, focused civil-
military operations, and information operations (IO). This operation has come to be 
known as the “Basilan Model.” Wilson describes the general information on Basilan 
Island as follows:  
Basilan Island is located 1,000 kilometers south of Manila at the northern 
tip of the Sulu Archipelago in the war-torn Southern Philippines. Basilan 
is 1,372 square kilometers in size and home to a population of just over 
300,000 people. As the northernmost island in the Sulu Archipelago, 
Basilan is strategically located. It has traditionally served as the jumping-
off point or fallback position for terrorists operating in Central Mindanao, 
and its Christian population has long been prey to Muslim kidnapping 
gangs. In the 1990s, Abu Sayyaf established a base of operations there and 
began a reign of terror that left government forces struggling to maintain 
security as they pursued an elusive enemy.119 
 
 In October 2001, the U.S. Pacific Command deployed a Special Forces 
assessment team to the Southern Philippines. The team assessed an area and collected all 
necessary information in the local area (village level) about people, terrain, infrastructure, 
economics, education, government services, and enemy situation. This vital information 
allowed planners to know details of the area of operations and the terrorists/separatists’ 
movements. These assessments also provided critical information concerning the root 
causes of civil unrest at the village level. 
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The OEF-P planners and the Philippine team worked closely together, which 
enabled them to facilitate problems arising from multi-agency planning and 
synchronization. They applied principles from the Diamond Model and laid out three 
interconnected lines of operation consisting of, building the Philippine Armed Forces’ 
(AFP) capacity, while  focusing on both civil-military operations and information 
operations (IO). These lines of operation helped the Philippines security forces operate 
more effectively. These operations aimed to increase legitimacy and control of the region, 
reduce the insurgents’ local support, deny the insurgents’ sanctuaries, and disrupt the 
insurgents’ operations.   
The United States dispatched the Joint Task Force (JTF)-510, comprised of 1,300 
U.S. troops, to the Southern Philippines in February 2002. The decisive weapon of the 
U.S. was 160 Special Forces soldiers. The SF teams, with their language and cultural 
skills, worked smoothly with the AFP military counterparts and local villagers. The first 
and important goal was to establish a secure environment and protect the local populace. 
The SF teams trained and built up the AFP capacity, and accompanying units (as advisers 
only) on combat operations. The AFP increased patrolling in the area, which enabled 
them to seize the initiative from the insurgents. The team realized that the foundation for 
all other activities was to reestablish security and protect the Basilan people. 
After security was established, the civic-action projects started working which 
targeted meeting the basic needs of the local population based on assessment results. 
Later, the U.S. Naval Construction Task Group deployed to the island to execute larger 
scale projects. Humanitarian and civic-action projects on Basilan improved the image of 
the AFP and the Manila government. When security in the area was improved, villagers 
became more comfortable and openly shared information on the local situation with the 
AFP and U.S. forces. 
During OEF-P in Basilan, intelligence collection and sharing was also critical to 
the operation. The SF advisers conducted extensive information collection activities to 
gain situational awareness. The SF shared intelligence with the AFP and developed a 
clearer picture of the insurgents’ organizational structure. Some important information on 
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Abu Sayyaf was derived from the local people. This intelligence was used to conduct 
later combat operations against the Abu Sayyaf. As Wilson describes,  
By August 2002, just six months later, the synergistic effects of security, 
improved AFP military capability, and focused civil-military operations 
had isolated the insurgents from their local support networks. As the 
security situation on Basilan continued to improve, doctors, teachers, and 
other professional workers who had fled the island began to return, and the 
Philippine Government, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s 
Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program, the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao, and various non-governmental organizations brought 
in additional resources to further address the root causes of the civil 
unrest.120 
 
 After the successful operation on Basilan Island, the U.S. reorganized the JTF-510 
into a much leaner organization called the Joint Special Operations Task Force, 
Philippines (JSOTF-P), which assisted the AFP to operate against terrorism in Central 
Mindanao and Sulu Island. The SF advisory teams advised and assisted AFP units in 
planning and fusing all sources of intelligence to battle insurgent/terrorist organizations. 
There was also increasing use of information operations (IO). The JSOTF-P was able to 
create stability in the region and received a warm welcome from the local people of the 
southern Philippines.  
D. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
In 2001, Ivan Arreguin-Toft wrote an article “How the Weak Win Wars: A 
Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.”121 His article states that when the strong meet the weak 
in asymmetric armed conflict, strategy is more important than power. His studies showed 
that not only did weak actors have sporadic successes in asymmetric conflicts, but also 
that the trend of their successes was increasing. Arreguin-Toft argues that “the best 
predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes is strategic interaction.”122 
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121 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security, (Volume 26, Number 1, Summer 2001). 
122 Ibid., 95. 
 62
The author states a strong actor uses attack strategies, direct attack and barbarism. 
The weak actor uses defense strategies, direct defense and guerrilla warfare strategy. 
Arreguin-Toft states that:  
The universe of potential strategies and counterstrategies can be reduced 
to two distinct ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect. Direct 
approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that 
adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an 
adversary’s will to fight.123  
 
Arreguin-Toft adds that, “In asymmetric conflict, the longer a war drags on, the 
greater the chances are that the strong actor will simply abandon the war effort, 
regardless of the military state of affairs on the ground.”124 
Arreguin-Toft’s case studies in asymmetric conflict which date from the early 
19th century to the end of the Cold War show that, “First, weak actors were victorious in 
nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars….Second, weak actors have won with 




Figure 13.    Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor in  
   Four Fifty-Year Periods 126 
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Intuition might tell us that a strong actor’s power should overcome weak actors, 
but Arreguin-Toft notes that “history suggests otherwise.”127 In his study of strategic 
interaction and conflict outcomes, there are five hypotheses:128  
Hypothesis 1: When strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors 
defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win 
quickly and decisively. 
Hypothesis 2: When strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors 
defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak actors should win. 
Hypothesis 3: When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and weak 
actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should 
lose. 
Hypothesis 4: When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors 
defending with guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being equal, strong 
actors should win. 
Hypothesis 5: Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions 
and lose opposite-approach interactions. 
 
                           
Figure 14.   Arreguin-Toft’s Expected Effect of Strategic Interaction on Conflict 
Outcomes (expected winners in cells) 129 
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In the process of his research, he tested this hypothesis against 196 historical 
cases of asymmetric conflict. His summary of that research to support strategic 
interaction theory is a feasible analysis tool. The results show strong support for his 
thesis. Strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-
vis their weaker adversaries. Same approach interactions – whether direct-direct or 
indirect-indirect – favor strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, and victory 
conditions. Opposite-approach interactions – whether direct-indirect or indirect-direct – 
favor weak actors because they sacrifice values for time.  
This analysis suggests key policy implications for both weak and strong actors. 
For weak actors, successful defense against strong actors depends on an indirect strategy. 
Because indirect strategies such as guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) rely on social 
support, weak actors must work tirelessly to gain and maintain the sympathy or consent 
of a majority of the population. For strong actors, the strategic interaction thesis suggests 
that weak adversaries employing an indirect defense will be difficult to defeat. In the end, 
Arreguin-Toft suggests that: 
An ideal U.S. strategic response in an asymmetric conflict therefore 
demands two central elements: (1) preparation of public expectations for a 
long war despite U.S. technological and material advantages, and (2) the 
development and deployment of armed forces specifically equipped and 
trained for COIN operations….The United States must be prepared to 
fight and win both conventional and asymmetric or “small” wars. The 
strategic interaction thesis shows why the two missions demand two kinds 
of armed forces: one to defend U.S. interests in conventional wars, and 
one to defend them in asymmetric wars.130 
E. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 
Three years after the end of WWII, Malaya faced an internal insurgency 
conducted by the Malayan Communist Party (MPC). It took twelve years for the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Malaya (U.K. /GOM) to ultimately win the war in 
1960. The Malayan Emergency is a very interesting case study and definitely a good 
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model for counterinsurgency. The following brief story of The Malayan Emergency is 
based on R. W. Komer’s book, The Malayan Emergency in retrospect: organization of a 
successful counterinsurgency effort.131  
From the reading, we learned that in 1930, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 
was founded and most of their members were ethnic Chinese. During WWII, the MCP 
formed the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to fight against Japanese 
troops. At the war’s end, the British reestablished their control of the country in 
September 1945. There was a discrepancy between the MPAJA and the British. The 
MPAJA’s leader, Chin Peng, turned the MPAJA back to the MCP and aimed to bring 
down the government.  
In 1947, the MCP was gaining control of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions and led 291 strikes. As the resistance was escalating; the MCP turned its attention 
to terror. During October 1945 – December 1947, there were 191 murders and abductions 
by insurgents; during only the first six months of 1948, there were 107.132 In the first 
week of June 1948, seven persons were killed and ten wounded in a riot. An atmosphere 
of bitterness and defiance grew rapidly. On June 19, 1948, three European plantation 
owners were killed. Under considerable pressure from the situation, the United Kingdom 
and the Government of Malaya (U.K./GOM) declared a State of Emergency.  
The MPC’s guerrilla forces estimate, in the early years, was around 12,000 
equipped with rifles, pistols, and light automatic weapons – largely from wartime British 
supply drops during WWII. The guerrillas lacked a radio which made them highly 
dependent on very slow courier communication. 133 Their movements were on a 
systematic strategy of a classic Maoist pattern. Supporting the guerrillas was the Min 
Yuen (or People’s Movement) organized clandestinely cell by cell, largely in the Chinese 
squatter villages. The guerrillas operated largely in the jungle. In late 1949 and 1950, 
insurgent incidents rose sharply.  In October 1951, the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Henry Gurney, was assassinated. 
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1. The British/Malayan Response 
The British had several important factors working for them from the outset. As 
Komer describes in his book, there were five significant factors that gave advantage to 
the government:134 first, long experience of the British in Malaya – knowledge of the 
country, control of influence over the local government, and traditional local respect for 
impartial justice under rule of law. Second, a workable administrative structure – well 
organized territorial machinery with a long tradition was in place before the insurgency; 
both army and police had mostly British officers. Third, Malay loyalty – Malaya’s 49 
percent Malay population firmly supported the government. Much anti-Chinese sentiment 
existed, and a 12 percent Indian population crucially weakened the insurgents’ popular 
appeal. Fourth, anti-colonialism was not a major issue – early independence for Malaya 
was not in doubt, the GOM in 1948 being Malayanized, which definitely took the 
insurgent movement of this element of appeal. Fifth, economic constraints – the 
U.K./GOM was almost bankrupt after WWII, and needed to choose a long-haul, low-cost 
counterinsurgency strategy with the maximum use of locally available assets.  
During the early years (1948-1950), the U.K./GOM response was quite 
inadequate, and it looked as though they were losing. The unified top-level command was 
lacking good intelligence; guerrilla contacts largely failed. Coordination between the 
military and police was still poor. Komer quotes Clutterbuck’s description of the early 
years saying: 
The soldiers and police were killing guerrillas at a steady 50 or 60 a 
month, and getting 20 or 30 surrenders, but the Communists were more 
than making up for this by good recruiting…. The guerrillas were 
murdering more than 100 men a month, and the police seemed powerless 
to prevent it….There was a growing danger that the police and the civilian 
population would lose confidence in the government and conclude that the 
guerrillas in the end must win….The main reason why we were was losing 
was that the guerrillas could get all the support they need – food, clothing, 
information, and recruits – from the squatters.135 
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In 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs became Director of Operations. He 
was the former commanding general in Burma and had experience in guerrilla warfare. 
He developed what is known as the “Briggs Plan,” which, with later modifications, lasted 
throughout the Emergency. His plan included: 136 
• separating the guerrillas from the people  
• formalizing and strengthening the COIN management system 
• strengthening intelligence as the key to anti-guerrilla operations  
• deploying the security forces on a primarily territorial basis 137 
 
Briggs favored distributing a brigade to each state and a company or so per 
district for small-unit operations instead of the heavy emphasis on large troop sweeps. 
After Briggs retired in November 1951, General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed 
Director of Operations.   
2. Role of the Police 
The police played a key role in providing local security, enforcing the rule of law, 
and acquiring intelligence. In 1948, the police force was weak and inadequate. Most of 
the police were Malay with a small number of British officers. Chinese speakers were 
needed but lacking; in 1947 the force had only 24 Chinese inspectors and 204 
policemen.138 When the Emergency was declared in 1948, the first major step was to 
expand the police force and also create large paramilitary forces. Because the U.K./GOM 
wanted quality officers rather than quantity, an extensive new training program was 
developed, with emphasis on civil police duties and good relations with the populace. By 
the end of 1952, the police force had risen to some 28,000 – including 2,488 Chinese.139 
Komer states that:  
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In the early days the weakly manned village police post became a favorite 
target of guerrilla groups. But these posts were to be quickly strengthened. 
Gradually the local security force in each Chinese village came to be a 
police post of ten to twelve Malay constables, supported by a part-time 
Home Guard of about thirty-five men, of whom normally five were on 
duty patrolling the perimeter at night. Most villages also had a Chinese 
Special Branch sergeant….In 1949 the police also formed their own 
platoon-size ‘jungle squads’ for jungle patrolling – a total of 253 by the 
end of that year. These men later were organized into a Police Field Force 
of about three thousand, specially trained to man posts in the deep jungle. 
The police conducted a significant proportion of total patrols and 
ambushes, perhaps as many as a third of the total.140 
 
There was a need to reinforce the police in their local security role, thus special 
constables groups were formed and received training. The number of special constables 
rose to 40,000 by the end of 1951 and was kept stabilized.141  Komer states: 
Their chief role was local protection of mines and plantations. As security 
improved, many of the special constables were later organized into Area 
Security Units of twenty-one men whose primary task was enforcing food 
control, and Police Special Squads whose role was reconnaissance and 
patrol for the District Special Branch Officer. They were completely 
phased out in 1960.142 
In September 1950, General Briggs created the volunteer, part-time Home Guard 
as part of his squatter resettlement program. In late 1951, the number of Home Guard had 
reached 99,000 men. A three-phase training program was launched and in the final phase, 
the guards could be armed – usually with shotguns. The Home Guard operated under the 
police; its roles were very useful. By 1953, some 50,000 Chinese were serving in it and 
protecting their own villages.143   
During 1948-1950, good intelligence was lacking. Little was known about the 
insurgency’s order of battle or command structure. Thus, in August 1948, a Malayan 
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Special Branch was reestablished under the Deputy Commissioner of Police. There was 
also a Chinese contingent in the Special Branch. The Chinese contingent missions were 
surveys and patrols only, not targeted operations and they were very successful. 
In April 1952, Templer brought in Mr. John Morton, an experienced civilian who 
had been chief of MI-5 in Singapore.144 Captured documents, and prisoners were sent to 
the Special Branch for exploitation. Thirty special military intelligence officers were 
attached to the Special Branch at various levels. Komer states that:  
Morton created an interrogation center staffed largely with ex-insurgents. 
As other measures took effect, the flow of intelligence from the ethnic 
Chinese population gradually increased and permitted much better 
targeting of security force operations. Many surrendered enemy personnel 
were successfully turned into agents and informers.145 
3. Role of the Military 
At the beginning in 1948, there were only 5,784 combat troops and 5,660 service 
troops in Malaya. In 1952, the combat troops were increased to 22,000 (around 23 
infantry battalions); its peak in 1956 was 22,500.146 Although the military role in COIN 
was essential to success, it was limited. In the early years, the military had to assist the 
police and paramilitary forces in static security missions. But later on these tasks were 
gradually taken over by police and auxiliaries. Then, the military could turn to 
suppressing the guerrillas in the jungle. 
The military role in the Malayan Emergency was not of a typical character. 
Instead of operating as a large force and having their own command, units were dispersed 
and used in support of civil authority. Komer states that:  
Tactically, they never operated as divisions, and infrequently even as 
brigades or even battalions, but mostly in dispersed company and smaller 
units. Instead of having their own intelligence, they depended mostly on 
that from the police.147  
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However, the military adapted themselves well from conventional WWII style to 
small unit jungle warfare. The “jungle operations training” was set up and emphasized 
patrolling. Overall, ambushes and patrolling by using smaller forces was very successful 
in countering the guerrillas.  
Another measure that could push guerrillas out of the jungle was the “food 
control” program. Food and medicines were strictly controlled. The food control 
programs came along with curfews and checkpoints. The military checked the amounts of 
food and supplies that the people purchased and kept records. The military carefully 
conducted inspections of roads and rail traffic at checkpoints. All vehicles, men, women, 
and children were searched each time they left the villages. Komer describes that:  
Over time, this complex of food and resource controls together with the 
food denial operations seem to have done a great deal to sap insurgent 
strength. It forced the guerrillas to expose themselves to patrols and 
ambushes, and eventually to surrender in increasing numbers under the 
pressure of hunger.148 
4. Separating the Insurgents from their Popular Base 
It is clear that one of the most effective U.K. /GOM counterinsurgency techniques 
was the breaking of the links between the insurgents and the Chinese community, 
especially the squatters. This was done through a series of carefully coordinated civil 
programs which consisted of: 149 
• registration, travel control, curfews, ID card checks; 
• resettlement of the great bulk of the squatter population in new protected 
villages; 
• pervasive food and drug controls in “black” areas to deny the guerrillas access 
to food supplies; 
• accelerated social and economic development; 
• steady movement toward self-government and independence; 
• public information and psychological operations programs designed to keep 
the population fully informed of what was under way. 
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These programs were essential for counterinsurgency in Malaya and enable the 
U.K. /GOM to control the population. Komer explains that:  
Each of these programs reinforced the others. Moreover, all were 
conducted within the framework of a rule of law which carefully spelled 
out what the government and security forces could and could not 
do….These programs reflected a dual strategy of control and 
accommodation – control of those people and resources which could fuel 
the insurgency and accommodation to those popular aspirations which 
were seen as helping rob the insurgency of its political appeals….This has 
been loosely called the carrot and stick approach. 150 
There were also six main features that the U.K./GOM counterinsurgency policy 
and strategy that gradually developed after an initial period of confusion:151  
• balance – multifaceted response – balanced civil/police/military operations;  
• territorial framework – war management followed existing administrative 
lines from village to district to state to Federation level;  
• unified management – a British-style committee system, top policy direction 
became centralized, execution was decentralized to state and district level or 
even below;  
• reliance on intelligence – the U.K./GOM emphasized it as crucial to success. 
Instead of building up a big new military intelligence structure, expansion of 
the Police Special Branch was chosen as by far the best for the purpose. Major 
reliance was placed on inducing defections and on other forms of 
psychological warfare; 
• separating the insurgents from the people – launching a series of major 
programs such as registration, resettlement, and food control to deny men and 
resources to the guerrillas; 
•  satisfying popular aspirations – improved economic and social services which 
is essential to victory. At the same time, the British made every effort to bring 
the ethnic Chinese fully into Malayan political life, as a viable alternative to 
revolt. Phased steps toward independence further undercut the MCP 
contention that revolt was the only road to this goal. 
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5. Mopping Up 
By Mid-1954, the new Director of Operations, General Bourne, modified the 
“Briggs-Templer strategy” from “rolling up the insurgents from south to north” into 
destroying the insurgent organization in the weakest area first.152 An area clear of the 
insurgents would be declared as “white.” The government force then moved to other 
“black” areas and cleared each of them. This strategy gradually worked. By mid-1955, a 
third of Malaya’s population lived in cleared “white” areas, and the security forces were 
gradually being phased down. There was a mass surrender during 1957-1958. The few 
tough black areas were finally cleared in 1959. The Emergency was officially terminated 
in July 1960.153  
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IV. ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
In the southern Thailand insurgency, the military is one of the government’s 
assets which has to work in synchronization with other government agencies. In a 
counterinsurgency, the military provides the main effort of the government in suppressing 
the insurgents. Even though military officials are dedicated to working on this complex 
insurgency problem, unfortunately, the problem is not easy to solve. After four and a half 
years, insurgency incidents still continue. The insurgents are using guerrilla warfare and 
terrorist’s tactics as vital tools to conquer the government. Many government officials 
and innocent people have become victims of the insurgents. As civil security is crucial in 
an insurgency war; the military needs to protect the people from the insurgents’ 
influence. This chapter will examine the military’s role in achieving a safe and secure 
environment by using the “population and resources control measure” in order to find 
weak points and areas for improvement.  
A. A TUG OF WAR 
During the four and a half years of unrest, the government and the insurgents have 
been competing to control the population. Sometimes the government has gained popular 
support but sometimes so have the insurgents. In countering the insurgents’ activities, if 
the government’s response was too high (exceeding appropriate response – brutal) or too 
low (lower than local populace anticipated – ignoring), the government would lose the 
support of the masses. Similarly, the insurgents needed to control their attacks and to try 
not to exceed the local populace’s acceptance. In order to control the population and gain 
popular support, the government needed to implement only high legitimacy suppression 
and focus on the people’s needs and security while the insurgents obtained control of the 
population and gained popular support by using coercion and propaganda. 
1. First Round: Advantage – Insurgents  
Policing was attempted by the government as the main effort to solve the situation 
after the insurgency broke out on January 4, 2004. The police obtained the power to 
arrest without a court warrant in eight districts of the three southernmost provinces where 
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martial law was imposed. Under pressure from Prime Minister Thaksin, who set a seven-
day deadline to capture the perpetrators, the police arrested five suspects in early 
February. The detained confessed that they had been hired for $200 each by leaders of the 
insurgency groups – BRN and GMIP. However, it was later revealed that the confessions 
were extracted under police torture.154 Mr. Somchai Neelaphaijit, the suspects’ lawyer, 
had dedicated himself to helping people who had experienced injustice from the 
authorities. He had been a focus of assistance to people in the three southernmost 
provinces but had been kidnapped and disappeared the day after he called for an 
investigation into the torture of the suspects. Rumor spread that it was the police who 
kidnapped Somchai and later killed him.  
This sensitive issue caused dissatisfaction throughout the southern Muslim 
community. Furthermore, as the police had killed many people during the drug 
suppression in the south provinces one year before, it caused the people to feel 
uncomfortable with the police. They believed the rumor that the police really killed 
lawyer Somchai. The police were losing the trust of the population and were also being 
hated because of this incident. There were protests from Muslim people in some areas. 
The insurgents took this chance to use propaganda about the injustice and launched a 
series of attacks. Many police were murdered and police stations were bombed. The 
insurgents gained the advantage in this situation as most of the population had a bad 
feeling about the authorities. At the very early stage, the police, one of the most essential 
mechanisms in a counterinsurgency, was breaking down. 
Moreover, in the year 2004, there were two major incidents which caused a 
“serious impact” to the cooperation between local people and the authorities. First, was 
the storming of the Krue Se Mosque in April 28, 2004, where 32 Muslim militants were 
killed by the soldiers inside the historic mosque. Second, was the outcome of the Tak Bai 
protest on October 25, 2004, which ended with the deaths of 78 demonstrators.155 
Because of Prime Minister Thaksin’s slow reaction in which he showed no responsibility 
for the deaths of these people in these two incidents, more discontent filled the Muslim 
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people’s hearts.  With these situations, the insurgents again found an opportunity to 
exploit. They turned these issues to propaganda, gained more recruits, and used the issues 
as justification for launching more attacks against the authorities. From statistics, three 
weeks before the Tak Bai incident, there were 19 murders, five bombings, and one act of 
arson – a total of 25 incidents. But three weeks after that, there were 45 murders 
(included three beheadings), 11 bombings, and 12 incidents of arson – a total of 68 
incidents.156 The attacks increased by a rate more than double that of three weeks earlier.  
 
                         
Figure 15.   Map Showing the Insurgents’ Attacks Three Weeks Before Tak Bai  
  Incident.157 
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Figure 16.   Map Showing the Insurgents’ Attacks Three Weeks After Tak Bai   
  Incident.158 
The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents caused the government to lose trust and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Also many recruits joined the insurgents. These two 
incidents apparently caused a wave effect in the process of solving the problem. It made 
it more difficult to win the hearts and minds of the population. In late 2004, the 
government deployed eight Army Infantry Battalions, two Marine Infantry Battalions, 
Army Special Operations Task Forces, three Border Patrol Police companies, and six 
Paramilitary companies (Taharn Pran) into the region. 
2.  Second Round: Disadvantage – the Government  
The military and police who were deployed to the southernmost provinces did not 
have a clear idea or clear mission of what they had to do. It had been about twenty years 
before that the military had conducted a counterinsurgency against the communists. In 
2004-2005, the conventional soldiers were planning to conduct direct attacks against the 
insurgents, but failed, because the soldiers could not find or identify the insurgents. The 
                                                 
158 Source: Author (illustrated point of attacks using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map). 
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insurgents recognized the soldiers, because of their uniforms, but the soldiers did not 
know who the insurgents were. Insurgency warfare was not the war that the new 
generations of soldiers were trained for or could cope with. There were a couple of weak 
points about these conventional soldiers. They lacked counterinsurgency training, could 
not speak the local languages, and did not understand the Muslim’s culture and customs. 
Special Forces soldiers seemed to have more understanding of the counterinsurgency 
context and were capable in languages, but they were limited in numbers. Most of the 
insurgents’ areas of operations were in the cities not in the jungle any more. With “hit 
and run tactics,” the soldiers or police had a difficult time to counter the insurgents and 
instead became victims. Thus, at the outset, the police and soldiers were concerned with 
their own security, seemed to be less focused on the people, and did not understand the 
context of insurgency well. 
In 2005, the insurgents put more pressure on the government by targeting tourist 
sites and airports with the goal of damaging the economy in the area. On February 17, 
2005, one of the biggest bombs exploded at the Sungai Kolok Hotel, a famous hotel for 
tourists in Narathiwat. An authority said that this was the first time that the insurgents had 
used a high volume of fertilizer explosives (estimate 50 Kg. of ammonium-nitrate). On 
April 3, 2005, the Hat Yai International Airport, Carrefour Store, and Green World 
Palace Hotel in Songkhla province were bombed.159 The insurgents continued their 
attacks by targeting local leaders and village volunteers who cooperated with the 
authorities, employees in the government’s priority employment projects,160 and police 
and soldiers while patrolling. In July 2005, a series of bombs blasted in Yala district, 
Yala province causing an electric down time of three hours. Fertilizer explosives were put 
into fire extinguishers and were used as deadly attack weapons. The insurgents tried to 
obtain mass support by killing people who cooperated with the authorities and then 
spread rumors that the authorities were the murderers. The insurgents also wanted to 
create a rift between Buddhists and Muslims by targeting Buddhist monks. The 
insurgents handed out leaflets in many areas, induced Muslim people to stop working on 
                                                 
159 The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence. 
160 In order to improve economy, the government hires unemployed citizen in the area and assigned 
specific work for them.  
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Fridays (in accordance with the practice of Muslim holy prayer every Friday) and forbid 
people from cooperating with the government. The psychological operations (PSYOP), 
although not entirely successful, did have significant success in countering the 
insurgents’ propaganda and creating understanding between the people and the 
authorities. 
In 2006, the insurgents continued their attacks, and the authorities seemed to be 
blind to counter-attacks and the need for creating a secure environment in the area. The 
aggressive manner of Prime Minister Thaksin and his judges, accusing the insurgents of 
carrying out only petty crime, only added fuel to the flame. On January 18, 2006, the 
insurgents sabotaged 101 telephone repeater towers across the four southern provinces on 
the same day (48 in Pattani, 27 in Yala, 17 in Narathiwat, and 9 in Songkhla).161 Violent 
incidents continued to occur, bombings, ambushing and attacks on soldiers and police. 
The insurgents also focused on targeted state school’s teachers. During 2004-2005, 46 
teachers were killed. In 2006 alone, there were 70. Some schools had to close down from 
time to time and reopen only when the authorities were able to provide security. 
Guarding schools and school teachers became important missions for the security forces. 
On August 31, 2006, the insurgents bombed 22 banks in Yala province in one day, but 
fortunately all of the bombs were small in size. However, it definitely created chaotic 
conditions. In propaganda, the insurgency usually distorted information and sent out 
rumors such as soldiers raping Muslim women or soldiers arresting and killing innocent 
Muslims. There were an increasing number of Muslim protestors (women and children 
included) in many areas, demanding the authorities retreat from their villages and release 
detainees. It seemed like the insurgents were able to mobilize some groups of the 
population. The insurgents also resorted to acts of vandalism such as chopping down 
rubber trees and burning houses of Buddhist people. In the Bannang Sata and Than To 
district, 52 Buddhist families had to leave their homes and stay together in a Buddhist 
church area for more security.  
                                                 
161 The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence. 
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3.  Third Round – the Competition 
In September 2006, a military coup ousted Prime Minister Thaksin. The new 
interim government. led by (retired) Gen. Surayud Chulanont, changed strategy to be 
more conciliatory. Surayud traveled to the southern area many times, met with local 
religious leaders, community leaders and also convened with the authorities. In October 
2006, he apologized to the southern Muslim people for the wrong implementation of the 
previous government’s policy, which he characterized as being “hard-handed” about the 
problem and human rights abuses. He assured the southern Muslim people of the 
dismantling of the “black list” and permitted bail for many detainees. The Muslim 
community seemed to be satisfied with his policy. The government executed many 
development projects ranging from education to economics, politics, culture, religion, 
society and environment to improve the status quo. Surayud also revived the SBPAC 
(Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre) and CPM-43 (43rd joint Civilian-
Police-Military Command) which was dissolved by Thaksin in 2002.  
In 2007, the government and the insurgency were competing for control of the 
population. The insurgents had the advantage in this competition because they could 
coerce people by using terror, while the authorities had to create consensus in order to 
gain control and trust.  With the new policy of the government, the insurgents knew that 
there was a chance that they might lose many people under their control to the 
government, so the insurgents increased attacks and tried to intimidate the people as 
much as they could. Thus, the year 2007 had the highest statistics for insurgency-related 
incidents. There were 2,025 insurgency incidents with a total of 867 deaths and 1,720 
injured. 
In the past four years (2004-2007), the military has tried hard to counter the 
insurgents’ activities as best they can by, with, and through many counterinsurgency 
measures such as psychological operations, civil affairs, population and resource control, 
information operations, offensive/defensive operations, and intelligence.162 However, the 
military has not been able to improve the situation. Daily deathly incidents still threaten 
                                                 
162 Royal Thai Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 100-20 (Army Training Command, Bangkok, 
1997). 
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the morale of the population. The officials have arrested only few insurgents. Most of the 
people still have not cooperated with the government because of fear of being attacked by 
the insurgents. Substantial intelligence has not been obtained. Thus, the government 
needs to be seriously focused on civil security. Once the people are secure, the 
government should receive the people’s cooperation. In considering the military 
counterinsurgency measures, “population and resources control” seemed to be the best 
measures among the many that were able to provide security for the people and control of 
the area of operations. Thus, if the government can continue to improve the population 
and resources control measures, it will improve the situation.  
B. POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL 
In order to conquer the insurgents, information about the insurgents’ 
organizational structure and movements is needed. This information can be derived 
mainly from the local population. Yet, the insurgents usually have the advantage in 
controlling the population. In order to protect their organization and keep their secrets, 
the insurgents must not allow any cooperation between the people and the authorities, and 
usually, the insurgents target people who cooperate with the authorities. So, to obtain the 
information, the authorities must protect the people from the insurgency’s attacks, 
intimidation, or reprisals. In short, the authorities must create a secure environment for 
the people.  
In creating a secure environment and civil security, the military must focus on the 
population and resources control (PRC) which is one measure among many in 
counterinsurgency operations. The Royal Thai Army is using five measures in coping 
with insurgency problems; intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, offensive 
operations (capture or kill), and PRC. As the safety and security of the people is crucial, 
PRC measures are the method that enables creating a secure environment in an area of 
operations. The people will cooperate with the authorities or not, depending on their 
security. Yet, providing civil security is the most difficult, but the authorities must do 
their best to achieve this. A secure environment leads the way to conquering an 
insurgency. 
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1.  Concept and Goals of PRC 
The PRC activities focus on control of the people and resources in the areas of 
operations. If the insurgents are able to access people and resources, they will sustain 
their status or become stronger. Even though most of the people do not want to support 
the insurgents, they are coerced. Thus, the PRC measures aim to deny support and 
sanctuaries for the insurgents. But this can not happen if the people are not secure. In the 
U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3, the stated goals for the PRC are to163 
• Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the 
insurgents. 
• Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the 
population. 
• Detect and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities in the 
community. 
In order to sever the links between the population and the insurgents, the 
authorities must be able to first identify who the insurgents are and their movements in 
the community, and later to figure out the insurgents’ organizational structure. Yet, to 
identify the insurgents’ movement and structure, the authorities mostly rely on substantial 
intelligence from the people. Thus, the authorities need to protect the people, build a 
secure environment, and focus on the people’s needs. This will allow the silent majority 
of the people to cooperate with the authorities and reject the insurgents.   
In general, police and security forces are the main forces in PRC. The police must 
continue to enforce laws and order, and arrest criminals and outlaws. Police performance 
is a significant tool to increase legitimacy in the area of operations. However, there is a 
high potential for harm if power is used excessively or incorrectly. Assistance to the 
police is provided by the military and other security forces such as paramilitary or 
defense volunteers. These forces should have knowledge about basic laws, receive police 
training and police personnel should accompany them.  In conducting PRC, there are 
many measures. However, each measure must be adjusted to fit with the present situation 
                                                 
163 Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3: Foreign Internal Defense TTP for Special Forces 
(Washington DC, September 20, 1994), 3-23. 
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and area of operations. Failure to amend PRC measures will result in ineffectiveness in 
counterinsurgency. The PRC’s measures include164  
• Suspension of habeas corpus.  
• Curfews and blackout.  
• Travel restrictions.  
• Excluded or limited access areas.  
• Registration and pass systems.  
• Declaration that selected items or quantities of items, such as weapons, 
food, and fuel, are contraband.  
• Licensing, rationing, and price controls.  
• Checkpoints, searches, and surveillance.  
• Censorship.  
 
In conducting these measures, the normal daily life of the population will be 
affected, so the government should explain why it is necessary to use PRC measures. 
These measures can be conducted at the same time, not in sequence, up to the insurgency 
events. When the situation improves, the government should lift these restrictions. The 
authorities should prepare to relinquish some of the PRC measures to segments of the 
local populace such as defense village volunteers, who could carry on in their own way 
when the situation permits. This will allow the authorities’ freedom to move to another 
area of operations. 
However, these measures only are not sufficient to provide a secure environment. 
The most important thing is the need for the security force to stay in a specific area to 
secure and assist the people. The security force, which can be soldiers, police, border 
patrol police, or paramilitary forces, should stay in the village or city long enough to 
know the people, places, and terrain. This force is an important mechanism in creating 
trust and securing the environment for the people. The security force has to observe the 
people’s movements by both overt methods and covert methods. The idea behind using 
                                                 
164 U.S. Army, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20 / AFP 3-20, (1990), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020ape.htm#s_80 (accessed 
September 14, 2008). 
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this force, which can be combined with other forces, is to hold an area and establish a 
strong sense of immunity that, in turn, enables the insurgents influence to be repelled. 
In 2006, the U.S. Army released a new field manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. 
This manual called for an implementation of PRC as “stability operations.” Overall, the 
definition of PRC is almost the same as stated in FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low 
Intensity Conflict but provides more techniques, tactics, procedures, and consideration.  
The concept of stability operations was written as 165 
Stability operations focus on security and control of areas, resources, and 
populations. Civil security and civil control are types of stability 
operations. Army commanders expect a mission of protecting and 
providing security for a population to be expressed in terms of civil 
security or civil control. 
 
The new FM 3-24 provided some considerations when conducting civil security 
operations. The guidance is to learn the environment as much as possible, disrupt base 
areas and sanctuaries, deny external support, and to treat people with respect to avoid 
alienating anyone.166  This guidance is essential in doing PRC because the authorities 
have to have frequent contact with the population. Thus, it would be better if the 
authorities possessed a cultural and religious awareness, free of emotional bias, and 
understood the rules of engagement.  
2.  The PRC Implementation 
The area of operations (AO) in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, which is 
about 1,000 kilometers south of Bangkok, consists of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and 
another four districts of Songkhla (Chana, Depha, Nathavi, and Sabayoi) with a total area 
of 13,904.2 square kilometers. 167 Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are the areas of main 
focus while the four districts of Songkhla are areas of interest.  The terrain is mixed 
between tropical jungle in the mountain areas and flat surface areas in cities. There are 
two main rivers – Pattani and Sai Buri. Thailand and Malaysia share 506 kilometers of 
                                                 
165 U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, December 15, 2006), 5-11. 
166 Ibid., 5-12. 
167 Pattani has an area of 1,940.9 sq.km., Yala 4,521.1 sq.km., Narathiwat 4,475.4 sq.km., and four 
districts of Songkhla is 2,966.8 sq.km. 
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border. There is a population of 2,052,376 (1,017,966 men and 1,034,410 women) in the 
AO; 75 percent are Muslim, and most of the rest are Buddhist. 168  The local dialect is 
Malaya (Yawi). But, in general, people under the age of 50 are able to understand and use 
the Thai language well. There are around 300,000 Buddhist people living in the three 
southernmost provinces. There are 33 districts in the three focused provinces and another 
four districts in the area of interested of Songkhla province. Over all, there are 37 
districts, 330 sub-districts, and 2,027 villages as shown: 
 
Province # of district # of sub-district # of village 
Pattani 12 58 365 
Yala 8 155 635 
Narathiwat 13 77 670 
Songkhla 4 40 357 
 
Table 1.   Number of district, sub-district, and villages in the three southernmost provinces 
of Thailand 169 
The economy relies heavily on agriculture products, particularly rubber. The price 
of rubber depends on the global market. People also work in small to medium enterprises 
in the area. In terms of education, most of the people have had a traditional curriculum of 
Muslim study in ponoh (madrasas) religious schools. Modern subjects or secular study 
are taught in “private schools teaching Islam,” which offer a combined curriculum of 
Islam and secular subjects. There are also state schools that teach a secular curriculum 
only.  
The Army has been reinforced from eight battalions in the late 2004 to eighteen 
battalions in late 2007. Other forces that operate in the area include three Marine Infantry 
Battalions, four Border Patrol Police Companies, 84 Paramilitary Companies (Taharn 
Pran), Army Special Operations Task forces170 and approximately 3,000 local police, 
                                                 
168 Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” Senathipat Journal, (Bangkok, January-April 2008), 
28. 
169 Source: Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” Senathipat Journal, (Bangkok, January-
April 2008), 28. 
170 Special operations Task forces includes: 36 Special Forces Operation Detachment A, two Quick 
Reaction Forces Company, and Psychological Operations Task Forces. 
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3,000 full-time district defense unit personnel (known as Or Sor), 50,000 village defense 
volunteers (known as Chor Ror Bor), and 20,000 village security volunteers (known as 
Or Ror Bor).171  These forces conducted counterinsurgency together in southern Thailand 
in late 2007. However, during 2004-2005, there were very limited numbers of forces, 
which consequently allowed freedom of movement for the insurgents. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Map of district jurisdiction of the three southernmost provinces 172 
 
In performing PRC measures, checkpoints and roadblocks are commonly set up in 
every area. Each district has at least two checkpoints for entering and departing. Officials 
at checkpoints or roadblocks are mainly police and soldiers. In some places they are 
mixed together and in some places, not. At village levels, trained village defense 
volunteers equipped with shotguns help soldiers secure their own villages under the 
                                                 
171 Or Sor fall under Minister of Interior authority. Chor Ror Bor are make-up broadly reflects the 
demographic balance of the people in the region while Or Ror Bor is mostly exclusively Buddhist, often 
tasked with protecting Buddhist communities some of them stationed in Buddhist temple compounds. 
172 Source: No Author, “No one is safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border 
Provinces,” Human Rights Watch, (Volume 19, No.13 (c), August 2007), 3. 
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control of soldiers or police in that area. At checkpoints, the officials conduct 
identification card checks, and random vehicle searches. Officials also conduct road 
patrolling (vehicle-patrol) and, later, on-foot patrolling. The officials do not use many of 
other measures such as curfews, travel restrictions, limited access areas, or control of 
resources. The officials used to force curfews in two districts of Yala, but just for short 
periods of time. There are restrictions on registering and using mobile phones, as the 
insurgents used mobile phones to ignite their IEDs, but later on the insurgents turned to 
alarm clocks and batteries to detonate the bombs instead. 
In offensive measures, the military conducted four main operations: search and 
destroy armed insurgents: cordon and search; strengthen the status of local leaders such 
as village heads, and dissolve the insurgents’ structure on the village level.173 In 
searching for and destroying armed insurgents, soldiers did not have much success 
because of a lack of information. Typically, there is the pursuit of escaping armed 
insurgents after a crime has been committed. But when the officials are able to arrest the 
insurgents, usually, a murder weapon is not found because after killing a victim, other 
insurgents’ members will receive the weapon from the shooter somewhere near the crime 
scene and hide it. Then, the shooter will continue to escape without the weapon. In 
conducting cordon and search, many problems were created during the initial period 
because the officials lacked appropriate evidence to show when to search a suspected 
house,174 especially when searching a house of an imam or uztaz (religious teacher) who 
was respected by the people in a community. If the officials found nothing after the 
search, it created discontent in the population. The use of working dogs (police – K9) has 
been prohibited because such use is against Islam culture. However, in the first half of 
2008, cordon and search operations  began to succeed because the officials were able to 
obtain sufficient intelligence.  
In taking defensive measures, the military conducts personnel and place 
protection. There are many places that need to be secured, such as electric stations, 
railroads, rail stations, dams, and typical roads. In the past four years, electric stations, 
                                                 
173 Interview with Military Officials, Bangkok, June 2008. 
174 There is no need of a search warrant because the government proclaimed “martial law” in the area 
of operations. 
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railroads, and rail stations have been attacked by bombs many times. Some bridges have 
also been attacked. Thus, the officials have had to take measures to protect these 
infrastructures, as damage to them may directly affect the daily lives of the people. 
Regarding personnel protection, the officials needed to focus on protecting teachers and 
Buddhist monks’ because many teachers and monks were killed by the insurgents. In the 
AO, there are 291 Buddhist temples with 1,326 monks, which require 2,200 officials to 
provide protection. There are 1,102 schools with 16,440 teachers which require 3,700 
officials to provide security to them each day.175 Apart from this, the officials have to 
provide security in municipal areas and Buddhist community areas. Police are mostly 
assigned to perform urban protection while the military provides a secure environment in 
the rural areas.  
In the early years, the military set up base camps at places where conditions 
permitted and maintained at least a company size of around 150 men. Checkpoints were 
usually automatically set up on the road in front of the base camps. Infantry soldiers and 
Marines entered nearby villages by car and tried to know the people, but none of the 
military personnel stayed inside a village. Only Special Forces, who have special skills in 
making contact with the people, stayed with the people in a village. There are many tasks 
for the Special Forces such as surveillance, area assessment, psychological operations, 
intelligence, information operations, and conducting civil security as well. The Special 
Forces also added some more tasks to include training conventional troops in 
counterinsurgency and training village volunteers in self defense. The Special Forces’ 
missions are essential in counterinsurgency, but unfortunately, there are a limited number 
of Special Forces soldiers.   
In this new round of the insurgency’s revival, the insurgents are more 
sophisticated than in the past. They are well organized, able to access resources, and plan 
effective political and armed struggle activities. Their attacks have been switching 
between urban and rural areas; when the officials focus on urban areas, the insurgents 
then launch attacks in the rural areas, which force the officials, in turn, to move forces out 
of a city to secure the countryside. But when the officials are able to control the rural 
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areas, the insurgents then change to attacking inside the urban areas again. At the 
beginning, the police and soldiers were targeted by the insurgents, but when the police 
and soldiers became more cautious and became “hard” targets, the insurgents changed to 
attacking teachers. Similarly, when the officials focus on protection of the teachers, the 
insurgents then attack Buddhist monks, but when teachers, monks, and people have been 
protected, the insurgents turn to attacking the officials again. Furthermore, terrorist’s 
tactics such as bombings and assassinations are very difficult to counter. Thus, without 
taking the population and resources control seriously, the government will be unable to 
control the situation. 
C. SECURITY ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE 
In 2005, there were 134 officials and 330 civilians killed by the insurgents. The 
death toll increased to 206 officials and 402 civilians in 2006. In 2007, there were 2,025 
insurgency incidents with total of 867 deaths and 1,720 injured. During the first half of 
2008, there were 563 incidents with 302 deaths and 517 injured. These statistics show 
that even though population and resources control measures have been conducted, they 
were not effective enough to create a secure environment for the people and to control an 
area. The situation is still worrisome and unsafe for both lives and property. 
The officials failed to obtain substantial information from the people. In the past 
four and a half years, the military has worked very hard in the southern border provinces. 
At the beginning, there was no clear strategy to cope with the violence and turmoil. With 
long preparation, good organization, and good planning, the insurgents had the advantage 
over the government. Thaksin’s administration led an implementation effort to correct 
problems in a wrong direction which created more discontent among the Muslims. The 
authorities were blind in that they were working without substantial information from the 
people. Extrajudicial killings and arrests of suspected Muslims made the people lose trust 
in the authorities. After long periods of hard work and sacrifice led by the Army, the 
trend of violence seemed to have decreased since October 2007. However, in the first 
half-year of 2008, insurgency-related incidents still existed and threatened the 
government, even though the Army deployed more troops to the south. 
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In an insurgency state, the population is considered the center of gravity and is 
capable of giving valuable information about the insurgents. In order to defeat the 
insurgents, local people should cooperate with the authorities while opposing the 
insurgents. If people in the area do not provide any information about the insurgents, then 
the authorities must re-assess the situation.  From the author’s experience in dealing with 
the insurgency in southern Thailand, there are five categories of people in the area of 
operations (AO). First, in the worst case, are those who are inclined to support the 
insurgents. This does not mean that these groups of people help the insurgents in 
conducting their operations, but that they are sympathetic, agreeing with the insurgents 
and not cooperating with the authorities. This group may have had bad experiences with 
the government and share some part of the ideology of the insurgents. People in the 
second group are those who are deceived and influenced by the insurgents’ propaganda. 
These groups of people do not oppose the government at the beginning, but may 
eventually be persuaded by the insurgents, and are at risk of becoming insurgents 
themselves.  
The third group of people are those who do not want to be involved with the 
situation. They wish to ignore it and stay away from the problem, so they cooperate with 
no one. The fourth group, which can be a majority, are those who are intimidated by the 
insurgents. There are examples every day of people who cooperate with the authorities 
and are killed. So this group will stay away from the officials, even though they know of 
the insurgents’ movements. Lastly, are those who cooperate with the authorities. This 
group of people will be a minority if the authorities cannot provide a secure environment. 
Or, they can be a majority if they feel safe. Some people assist the authorities because 
their families were harmed or killed by the insurgents. Overall, among the five groups of 
people, there are four out of five that do not want to cooperate with the authorities. This 
gives a simple vision of how difficult it is to get information from the people in the AO.   
The authorities have often failed to identify the insurgents. Even though an 
intelligence community uses many tools to collect information, the insurgents have 
improved their skills to conduct counterintelligence. They know how to perform covert 
operations which make it hard for the authorities to track them. They carefully use 
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cellular phones and the internet by talking or writing in code. Over all, they “cover” their 
organization well. Even though the Special Forces put more effort in building 
relationships with the people, very little information about the insurgents is usually 
derived. It is possible that the population may know very little about the insurgents 
because the insurgents are good at keeping secrets. Captured insurgent members can be 
of benefit if they cooperate with the authorities, but most of them do not.  
The officials have failed to protect the population and create a secure 
environment. The authorities know that reducing and eliminating the daily rate of deadly 
incidents is the key to creating a safe and secure environment, but it is not easy. Most of 
the time, the insurgents make headway by launching deadly attacks and successfully 
escaping. The increased attacks against teachers and Buddhist monks forces the soldiers 
to set up many security units to guard them, and so those units lose their strength to 
perform other missions. The insurgents’ multi-attacks on many targets in many provinces 
on the same day not only create chaos, but also show that they are well organized in 
structure. The insurgents’ cells are able to work both independently and cooperatively, 
which is very difficult for the government to counter.  
In the south, there are two main areas where the insurgents launch their attacks; 
urban and rural. The government has assigned responsibility to the police in controlling 
urban areas and assigned rural areas to the military. In the city, the insurgents usually 
launch bomb attacks, and in the rural areas the insurgents frequently ambush officials and 
assassinate people with small arms. These tactics have given the advantage to the 
insurgents. First, by using bombs in the city instead of guns for murder, the insurgents 
can cover themselves well and need not escape from many eye witnesses. Second, 
ambushing and murdering with small arms in rural areas make it easier to escape into the 
jungle. Ultimately, most of the times, the authorities fail to pursue or arrest the 
insurgents. 
The authorities have failed to control certain area. Even though the military has 
dispatched constabulary forces to stay in the villages, set up QRF forces, and conducted 
patrols, insurgency incidents still occur. The incidents happen because there have been 
insufficient SF on the ground, laxness at checkpoints, and inadequate patrolling. The 
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PRC measures have not been strict enough in an area of insurgents’ influence. Besides, 
the government has lacked accurate assessments and the ability to assign proper national 
assets into specific areas. Therefore, the government can not control an area. 
In late 2007, military intelligence informed the (active) military that there were 
around 500 villages out of 1,670 villages, or just about 30 percent of the three 
southernmost provinces, which had been influenced by the insurgents.176 Among the 500 
villages, there were approximately 50 villages that were very highly influenced, 25 
villages that were highly influenced, 200 villages that were moderately influenced, and 
225 villages which were partially influenced. While there was a need to provide security 
for the remaining 1,170 villages, the military faced a difficult time controlling the 500 
villages first mentioned. However, with this information, the military seems to “see the 
light at the end of the tunnel” if proper methodology is applied.  
In sum, in order to win the battle, the military must control the areas that have 
been influenced by the insurgents, establish a secure environment and expand the area of 
security. But the key to achieving this result is for the military to improve the population 
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V. APPLYING THE COIN MODEL AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Insurgency-related incidents in the first half of 2008 indicate that the insurgents 
will continue to launch other attacks against the government’s agencies and the 
population. Thus, the government needs to improve any strategical, operational, and 
tactical weak points and rethink PRC measures. The following discussion in this chapter 
will apply the COIN Models in Chapter Three to the southern Thailand insurgency and 
determine what the military needs to consider and to implement in order to improve the 
PRC measures.  
A. THE DIAMOND MODEL 
In population and resource control, the Diamond Model provides the warning 
signs for the military to consider more effort in dealing with the people, rather than 
mainly looking forward to attacking the insurgents’ forces. The military needs to improve 
implementation in its efforts to cut the links between the people and the insurgents. 
Furthermore, the area of operations is close to the border in the south and the ocean in the 
east, so external support or logistics routes can be easily reached by the insurgents. The 
military should put more focus on securing the border and denying illegal crossings, 
while the government should continue creating good relationships, understanding, and 
cooperation with international countries that will support Thailand’s efforts to conduct 
counterinsurgency.  
In the past four years, there were many obstacles which stood in the way of the 
authorities approaching the people. Some of the obstacles that blocked the officials from 
getting close to the population were caused by the insurgents, and some were caused by 
the reactions of the government. The insurgents used their advantage as Malay Muslims 
who speak the same language as the local people to provoke the revolution. They planted 
the seeds of resistance among students in the madrasas and “private schools teaching 
Islam.” The insurgents also coerced and manipulated the people. Thus, the obstacles to 
the officials’ approaching the people were founded in religion, language, culture, and the 
resistance ideology.  
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The government’s implementations also created obstacles. The government must 
generate consensus in order to control the people. The government’s methods of 
suppression, based on unclear information, created bad results, especially when the 
officials operated with low-legitimacy, and were reactive and indiscriminate. Examples 
of such as cases included detaining persons without sufficient evidence, torture, 
disappearances and extrajudicial punishment. So, the authorities need to improve their 
efforts to insure that their operations are highly-legitimate, pre-emptive, and 
discriminating. The government should bring justice to the people and cease every option 
that brings about injustice, because the insurgents will use the injustice of the government 
as an important condition to provoke the people to rebel.  
All of the discussed obstacles block the officials from approaching the people. 
But, on the other hand, they facilitate the insurgents’ efforts (see Figure 18).  Thus, in this 
case, the government needs to improve its strategic implementations in order to reduce 
these obstacles.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Obstacles to State – Facilitation to Counter State 177 
 
                                                 
177 Source: Author 
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In order to sever links between the insurgents and the people, what the 
government needs to do is not only reduce and clear the obstacles, but it must figure out 
how also to build obstacles between the insurgents and the people. Thus, the government 
must focus on the people’s needs and security, and correct the flaws of its own 
implementation. If the government does so correctly, it will create obstacles between the 




Figure 19.   Facilitation to State –Obstacles to Counter State 178 
As Figure 19 illustrates, the government should conduct preemptive repression, 
not reactive repression, discrimination not indiscrimination, and highly-legitimate actions 
only. This behavior will restore trust with the people. Similarly with other operations, if 
the government improves the educational system and focuses on madrasas and private 
schools teaching Islam where the insurgents obtain their recruits, it will block new 
recruits from the insurgents. Issues of culture, language, and religion still facilitate the 
insurgents’ efforts. But, if the officials can improve cultural awareness and learn the local 
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language, such awareness and learning will facilitate the officials’ efforts as well. Lastly, 
the government must improve the PRC measures which will not only be able to create a 
secure environment but also sever links between the insurgents and the people. 
Other government measures such as political inclusion, improvement of 
economics and other military measures such as information operations and civil affairs 
will support the above efforts to decrease obstacles between the state and the people. If 
everything goes well, all the measures mentioned above will increase the people’s trust. 
The increasing of the people’s trust means the ability to control the people and de-
legitimize the insurgents. But, as of this writing, the PRC is not going well and needs to 
be improved in order to establish civil security.  
B. COIN MILITARY COMPONENTS 
The Royal Thai Army (RTA) has also used Special Forces as a constabulary 
force, used Ranger units as quick reaction forces (QRF), and has used infantry as 
movement-to- contact forces (MTC), similar to Wendt’s COIN Military Components. 
However, problems have occurred because of an inadequate number of SF soldiers. In 
one province, there were only twelve SF detachments available, which meant one SF 
detachment had to work for the whole district of about 5 to 10 villages. There was only 
one company of QRF in a province, which was insufficient. The MTC force usually 
performs patrols in vehicles, not on-foot. Furthermore, the military forces have routinely 
reshuffled in a period of every twelve or six months, which reduces the opportunity for 
the soldiers to become acquainted with the people, routes, and terrain in the area. Even 
though the military has been reinforcing more conventional troops every year, the 
number of SF is still inadequate. The PRC measures are not strong enough to limit the 
freedom of maneuvers of the insurgents and to protect the populations.  
There was an idea proposed of assigning military forces to “cover” an area but not 
“control” an area. The military just set a base camp near certain villages. However, this 
was an unsuccessful deterrence. Special Forces, which are fewer in number, are the only 
security force that stays in the villages. Therefore, this effort to control an area has been 
unsuccessful. In some places, the insurgents manipulated the people to protest against the 
security forces. For example, the insurgents spread rumors that the soldiers raped a 
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Muslim woman. The villagers demanded the soldiers draw back from the village, which 
resulted in the officials retreating.  The increase of daily deadly incidents shifted the 
focus of the military from “covering” an area into providing security for schools, 
teachers, monks, roads and railroads. The SF were also busy training the village defense 
volunteers and paramilitary forces. Thus, the implementation of “control” of this area was 
unsuccessful. 
1. Latest Information about the Insurgents 
In late 2007, military intelligence informed the (active) military that there were 
approximately 500 villages that had been influenced by the insurgents and that each 
village had at least one commando detachment – RKK (Runda  Kumpulan Kecil). The 
RKK is a small unit of militants consisting of six men. The militants are trained in 
guerrilla tactics to attack officials and carry out other insurgency incidents. The officials 
knew that RKK forces had around 3,000 men in 500 villages, but that these did not 
include supporters (tolongan) who are estimated at around 10,000 – 20,000.179 The 
supporters are the group which observe and notify the RKK about the officials’ 
movements, move weapons for the RKK before and after operations, scatter nails or chop 
down trees to block roads, and help the RKK to escape. The BRN – Coordinate is the 
insurgency group which established the RKK force and also set up a “shadow 
government” to facilitate counter-state operations. At the village level (ar-yoh), the head 
of the village is called ar-yoh and controls the RKK, the supporters, and the village’s 
committee which consists of a religious board (ulama), youth and women’s board 
(permudor), logistics board (logistik), and finance board (kurwagan).  
Above the village level is a sub-district level (lingkaran). The head of the 
lingkaran is called a gumit who commands and controls the ar-yoh level. At the district 
level (daerah), a sakom is the head. At the province level (wilayah), a sakomvel is the 
head and at the region level (many provinces) a gus is the head. The insurgents within 
 
                                                 
179 Interview with Military officials, Bangkok, June 2008. 
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this organization operate in both political offense and military operations.180 Thus, with 
this vital information, the military should deliberately consider how to deal with these 
insurgents and how to control an area effectively, not just to cover an area. 
2. The Implementation 
In controlling an area, the RTA does not have problems with the quick reaction 
forces (QRF) or movement-to-contact forces (MTC) but with the constabulary. The 
Royal Thai Army Special Forces (RTASF) has only 150 SF detachments and SF soldiers 
cannot be mass produced in a short period of time. So, there are two options available for 
conducting these missions successfully. First, to train other forces and use them as 
constabularies to compensate for the SF detachment shortage. Second, to start work with 
the number of forces available by making the village clear of the insurgents’ movements 
or activities and sustaining that status to establish security, village by village, until the 
last one is “clear.” 
The first choice can be performed, but there will be a lack of effectiveness. The 
constabulary force is the most important and must possess high-level skills in the 
execution of its operations. The second choice is more feasible, but some problems might 
occur if it is not well planned. For instance, if “red” villages are more dispersed than in a 
nearby area, more QRF and MTC forces will be needed in operations.181 Moreover, the 
RTA needs to protect other “green” villages (about 1,000) while repelling the insurgents 
from “red” villages. If the “green” villages that are not secure, or the insurgents will 
move from the “red” villages to the “green” villages instead. The RTA must make sure 
that the “green” villages have sufficient ability to protect themselves. Besides, the 
insurgents might move from “red” villages into the city, too, so the officials also need a 
plan to protect rural areas.  
 
                                                 
180 Interview with Military officials, Bangkok, June 2008. 
181 “Red village” means villages that were highly influenced by the insurgents. “Yellow village” 
means villages that were moderately influenced by the insurgents, and “green village” means villages that 
were clear from the insurgents’ influenced. 
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As the insurgency situations in southern Thailand do not only occur in rural areas 
such as small town or villages, but in the crowded city areas where a district or a province 
is situated, counterinsurgency in the city area is another big challenge for the officials. 
The police have the responsibility to secure the city area, but events in the past have 
shown that the police are not capable of controlling the area of responsibility, even if 
there are many surveillance cameras. The bombing of 22 banks, airports, shopping 
centers, restaurants and hotels occurred in city areas. During 2005-2006, there were few 
police who conducted foot-patrol in the cities.182 Thus, the police should increase on-foot 
patrols in the city areas. If there is not sufficient force, the military should provide 
support personnel to the police. Police in the city should perform the same task as the 
constabulary does in the villages and make sure that there are officials to monitor the 
surveillance cameras. The police should establish and train “city volunteers” in order to 
increase “eyes and ears.” 
The officials who work at the border should be cautious and alert while the other 
officials are working in “red” villages. The border officials should focus on legal and 
illegal border crossings to neighboring countries because many of the Thai Muslim 
people in the south have two nationalities. The wide openness of the border just increases 
difficulties for the officials to capture the insurgents. However, if the officials were able 
to build “strong” villages that could resist the return of the insurgents effectively, the 
border problems would not be an issue. 
Accurate assessment is another field in which the RTA needs to improve. Most of 
the questions that an assessment team, (mostly the SF detachments) ask the people are 
about the insurgents’ movements and activities. They also collect details of an area of 
operations, but ask few questions of the people themselves about what they really need. 
Another unit that conducts the assessment is the psychological operations units, but their 
questions are mostly about people’s attitudes to the insurgents and attitudes toward the 
government. However, the information is valuable. It needs to be updated periodically. 
                                                 
182 Observations derived from author’s experience while working in the area of operations. 
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The RTA has lacked a good process in assessment. Until 2007, there was no clear 
answer as to whether every village in the AO had been assessed.183 There are no 
assessment teams that consist of psychologist, doctor, cultural and regional experts, rather 
most teams consist of soldiers solely. Some of the assessment teams do not live or 
operate in the areas they are assessing, so it is difficult to have an accurate assessment 
which can result in the wrong application of MIDLIFE resources.  In the past, some 
village’s projects did not come from the people’s needs, but from local government 
agencies and local politicians. Thus, the military should focus on an accurate assessment 
in order to correct and improve any erroneous MIDLIFE actions.   
C. OEF – PHILIPPINES 
The Basilan Model is a good model that can be used to deny terrorists occupation 
areas and some parts can be used for counterinsurgency as well. The model illustrates 
that the first and the most important thing is to create a secure environment for the 
people. There is a need to increase patrolling to seize the initiative from the insurgents. 
Once security is established, the government can bring in development projects that meet 
the basic needs of the communities. When people feel comfortable, safe, and trust the 
authorities, they will give vital information to the authorities, which will lead the 
government to capturing or killing the insurgents. Thus, the Basilan Model does prove 
that if the government is able to provide civil security, there is a chance to conquer the 
insurgents. 
However, Basilan Island and the southernmost provinces of Thailand are quite 
different in context, especially with regards to the conditions which led to the conflict. 
The Abu Sayaff is a terrorist organization, the goal of which is not necessarily to start a 
revolution. Thus, the organizational structure of the Abu Sayaff is different from a 
revolutionary organization. An insurgency needs mass support, but terrorists do not. In 
addition, the issues involving history, religion, or ethnicity are different from those on 
Basilan. The people involved have different grievances, ideas, and interests. The area of 
operations, the size of  the population and the number of the insurgents are also all 
                                                 
183 Interview with Military Official, Bangkok, 2008. 
 101
different. Basilan Island has 1,372 square kilometers and around 300,000 people, while 
southern Thailand has 13,904 square kilometers and around 2,005,000 people. Thus, 
basically, a smaller area and smaller population should be easier to work with. 
Furthermore, Basilan is an island, a feature which hinders both external support and 
escape.  
Still, The Basilan Model provides an example of a successful operation using the 
indirect approach. It showed important steps in the areas of area assessment, planning, 
execution, and the invaluable work of SF soldiers. Thus, in conducting PRC, the Thai 
government should adopt these steps and apply them. The government should keep in 
mind that civil security should come first. The Thai military must be embedded in the 
community, just as the U.S. SF soldiers were, in order to increase legitimacy, and provide 
security for the people while the government prepares to render support and executes 
projects that benefit local people and improve their living conditions. 
In conducting an indirect approach in southern Thailand, there are some areas 
which could generate indirect assistance to the counterinsurgency. Those areas include 
education, law and order, healthcare, civil rights, religion, and politics. For example, in 
education, many schools in the south have been infiltrated by the insurgents who plant 
the seeds of hatred for the government and recruit new members. The government must 
protect students from being recruited by the insurgents, especially in madrasas and 
“private schools teaching Islam.” In regards to law and order, for decades, southern 
border provinces have had a reputation of being governed by abusive officials. Many 
innocent people were put behind bars. Social grievances and discontent gradually 
increased, leading many to resist the authorities. Thus, the government should provide 
justice and assure no excessive use of power. If the government fails to do so, more 
recruits will be lost to the insurgents. 
In order to counter the insurgency in the long-term, supportive religious leaders 
are essential.  Religious leaders who strongly believe that Islam is a religion of peace and 
refuse to use violence or to kill people to change the status quo could help the state to 
deal “indirectly” with the insurgents. Most of the people in the Muslim community pay 
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respect to the Imams. But in the past, the insurgents have also infiltrated and 
contaminated the religious organizations.  So, the government should protect religious 
leaders from the insurgents.  
Lastly, the head of the village is another important person. If every village has an 
effective village leader who is dedicated to creating peace and prosperity for his 
community, the province should have peace. Unfortunately, many village leaders have 
been induced by the insurgents to join the southern secession. Thus, the government 
should work in two directions; first, to identify good village leaders and support their 
roles to establish trust and respect from the villagers. Second, to identify village leaders 
who were influenced or coerced by the insurgents, then sever those links to the 
insurgents, and free the village leaders from intimidation. Most of the village leaders are 
born in local areas and know the details of the village, so the officials should use them as 
vital tools to create stability in the villages. The village leader will stay in the village for 
good, but the military will draw back.  
D. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
Arreguin-Toft’s articles illustrate that to conquer a small actor who uses an 
indirect approach; the strong actor should use the indirect approach against that small 
actor. Thus, the Thai military should use an indirect approach towards the insurgents in 
order to win the battle.  In this case, to some degree, the military has been blocked by 
stereotyping. In general, high ranking Thai officers are mostly acquainted with 
conventional warfare and possess Cold War experience. They tend to embrace a common 
theme of using overwhelming force to crush the insurgents. But, when the troops are 
deployed into an area of operation, the troops cannot find the enemy as easily as in a 
conventional war. Furthermore, the population typically will not have provide any 
substantial information about the insurgents, resulting in unsuccessful operations. 
Experience from the Cold War, particularly in fighting communism is quite different 
from experience in fighting an insurgency. The communists have bases in the forests 
outside of villages or cities, while today’s insurgents are living in houses similar to those 
of normal people. Some high ranking officers think that capturing or killing more 
insurgents means that the government is winning the war, yet, nobody knows how many 
 103
insurgents there are. Signs of winning should be observed by the cooperation extended by 
the population, the decrease in insurgency incidents, and the increase in the number of 
insurgents surrendering. Thus, the conventional soldier should avoid stereotyping and use 
a more indirect approach than a direct approach. 
In conducting PRC, to provide civil security and a secure environment by using 
an indirect approach, the military may use “invisible tactics” while patrolling and 
controlling an area. One of the disadvantages for the officials is that the officials have to 
work in uniform, which can make them easy targets for the insurgents. Thus, to 
compensate for this disadvantage, the officials should increase the number of civilian 
uniform officials. Officials who work in civilian clothes will conduct surveillance, 
identify and track the insurgents’ movements.  
In the city, the police can disguise themselves as taxi or bus drivers. This is very 
helpful because the officials are patrolling and surveying an area without being noticed 
by the insurgents. The officials can use their skills in observing unusual things in a city. 
Apart from taxi drivers, the officials can be disguised as homeless individuals or beggars, 
in order to collect information. In the rural areas, the officials may disguise themselves as 
school teachers, postmen, or small business merchants. The tactics they can employ may 
include sending spies into suspected organizations such as schools, charity organizations, 
mosques, coffee shops, markets and other easily accessed areas. The officials can use 
local people (after examining their personal history and information) as reporters who 
continually look for suspected acts or suspected persons and report to the officials. These 
measures should compensate for the officials’ disadvantages and increase the probability 
of creating a safe and secure environment in the area of responsibility. 
E. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 
The United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya’s (U.K. /GOM) response 
toward the insurgency problem during 1948-1960 was an excellent model. Many PRC 
measures were seriously conducted, particularly in area control, food control, and 
separating the guerrillas from the people. The advantageous part of this operation was 
that the U.K. /GOM seriously trained and increased the number of the police instead of 
the military, enabling the government to enforce law and order in rural areas and carry 
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out repression with a high degree of legitimacy. Using small military units, rather than 
large units, is appropriate to deal with the insurgents who have dispersed into many areas.  
Lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency, in PRC, are that the Thai military 
should consider spreading out its battalion or company bases into platoon level bases. 
The dispersion of force will increase the capability of observation and surveillance as 
well as limit the freedom of maneuvers of the insurgents. The military should increase 
on-foot patrols, rather than vehicle patrols, because vehicle patrols are less effective and 
provide more conspicuous targets. Paramilitary forces can reinforce the military in 
patrolling and ambushing, but it must be insured that such paramilitary forces understand 
the rules of engagement. The operations of the paramilitary forces must be conducted in 
highly legitimate areas only. The village defense volunteers (Chor Ror Bor) and village 
security volunteers (Or Ror Bor) need to protect their people and their villages seriously. 
The officials should use countermeasures against the insurgency’s spies that infiltrate the 
village defense volunteers and village security volunteers.  
A checkpoint is one of the official’s weakest points in PRC. In most areas, 
checkpoints do not operate in the morning and evening during rush hours. In some places, 
checkpoints operate only at night. Many checkpoints are placed in front of military base 
camps or in front of police stations where they cannot effectively control the direction of 
vehicles on the roads. Most of the checkpoints never change their locations. “Hasty 
checkpoints” are rarely used. A weakly functioning checkpoint can open the door of 
opportunity for the insurgents to move illegal objects through checkpoints during the 
non-operating time. Most of the checkpoints have not had on-line computer systems that 
enable the officials to check license plates immediately in order to examine stolen 
vehicles or suspected persons.  
The government should consider increasing the number of police in the area, but 
the increase should not jeopardize the quality of the police force. At the same time, the 
police must work with a high degree of legitimacy. The Muslim people in the south still 
have bad memories of how the police abused their power in recent years. The police are 
an essential mechanism in a counterinsurgency, as exemplified by the Malayan 
Emergency. Thus, if the Thai government is able to balance civil/police/military in 
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operations, that balancing should improve the situation, as opposed to increasing the 
military and paramilitary forces which may risk further human rights violations and 
abuses of power. The government must focus on psychological operations and 
information operations to create understanding and cooperation between the population 
and the authorities. When the situation improves, the government should decrease the 
power of the officials and reduce various martial laws in order to protect the people’s 
civil rights. The military should improve PRC measures which will ultimately create a 
secure environment for the people and separate the insurgents from the people. A 
deliberate plan is needed to control an area; protect the “green” area, clear and hold the 
“yellow” and “red” areas – eventually turning them into “green” areas, and lastly, after 
establishing security areas, expanding them all over the area of operations. 
F.  SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed above, in order to win the battle, the government must improve the 
PRC measures which will create a secure environment where people will receive 
protection. This is the most important fundamental of operations before the government 
focuses on other fields. In the past four years, the government has failed to provide 
security and has lacked substantial information from the people. The war has been 
protracted. It is not too late for the government to seriously conduct PRC and bring back 
peace to the southern region. The author’s recommendations are: 
• The government must implement PRC to “control” an area, not just 
“cover” an area. In the past, the military saw the necessity of having 
security forces in an area to control the situation, but the safety of the 
population and a secure environment could not occur if the security forces 
did not strictly control and hold an area. 
• Controlling an area and annihilating insurgent members in an area is the 
most important thing to do, because there are many villages to control and 
it is impossible to control them all at the same time. Thus, the government 
should: 
• Strengthen “green” villages, aim for self protection, the ability to 
detect, deny, report and arrest intruders. 
• Consider which “red” or “yellow” villages need to be controlled. 
The number of villages should be in an acceptable ratio with the 
troops available: better if beginning with a group of adjacent areas, 
not a remote area. 
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• An SF detachment should be the main force of constabulary which 
is supported by police and paramilitary forces. 
• Paramilitary forces can be used as constabularies after the village 
is secure and the SF need to move to another area. 
• Strict PRC measure must be conducted in those “yellow” and “red” 
areas. 
• Conduct a census in each village to know exactly who belong in 
the village. 
 
• Focus on border crossings both legal and illegal, to identify insurgent 
members. 
• Request the Malaysia government to record addresses in Malaysia of Thai 
travelers to Malaysia. 
• Sever support and logistics from external areas. 
• Strict control of IEDs’s compound.  
• Increasing “on-foot” patrolling, avoid routine vehicle patrols. 
• Improve performance at checkpoints: 
• Checkpoints should operate 24 hours a day. During rush hours the 
official need not stop and search every vehicle but must randomly 
search or search suspect ones. Closing operations during rush hour 
will cause ineffective results. 
• Checkpoints should be located at proper points which enable 
controlling the entrance and departure from specific locations. On 
a main road, a checkpoint should have enough space for a holding 
area and search area. 
• Provide on-line computer systems at checkpoints to immediately 
detect suspected vehicle and persons. 
• Increase performance of hasty checkpoints. 
 
• Increasing the control over the people by increasing consensus. 
• The government should conduct repression with preemptive not reactive 
measures, be discriminate not indiscriminate, and only act with high-
legitimacy. 
• Increase number of officials in civilian uniform; do not expose them to the 
public. 
• Establish and train “city volunteers” in order to increase “eyes and ears” in 
the city. 
• Conduct accurate assessments in order to correct and improve any error in 
MIDLIFE actions. 
• Support village leaders’ roles and increase cooperation with village 
leaders to control village area. 
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• Use an indirect PRC approach such as using local people for secret 
surveillance and as reporters. 
• Disperse military forces into smaller units such as platoon levels. The SF 
might stay with an infantry platoon for more security. 
• Detect insurgency’s spies that infiltrate village defense volunteers and 
village security volunteers. 
 
Effective PRC measures may have more details and tactics than discussed in this 
thesis. Thus, the military, police or village defense volunteers should convene and 
exchange experience, pro and con, or differences in implementation in different areas in 
order to collect all important information and improve PRC measures. Other government 
efforts and all government agencies should support PRC operations and consider PRC 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Establishing civil security and a secure environment are substantial in insurgency 
warfare. If the insurgents can not easily commit their violent crimes against the people 
and the authorities, the insurgents’ influence will decrease. The government should hold 
an area and keep the people free from the insurgents’ coercion. As peaceful environments 
are established, the people’s trust in the government will increase, which will bring about 
cooperation and the secrecy of the insurgents will be exposed. However, security cannot 
be achieved unless the government focuses on the population and resources control 
measures.   
Pattani’s resistance has continued for generations, since the 1900s. But during the 
1960s to 2000s, we have learned that there have been prominent differences in the 
insurgents’ activities and their tactics. Armed struggle had changed from “classic low-
intensity conflict” which had guerrillas operating in the rural areas into “terrorist urban 
combat” which has the insurgents’ members operating in the city. The insurgents are 
more sophisticated, they plan well, and deliberately execute. This change in tactics is 
more difficult for the government to neutralize effectively. After four and a half years, 
since the revival of the insurgency began in 2004, the insurgent incidents still continue. 
The existence of “daily deadly incidents” in 2008 indicates that the insurgents still have 
freedom of maneuvers despite heavy government suppression. 
Although there are many measures and many practices to a counterinsurgency 
such as information operations, civil affairs, intelligence, political, and economic 
measures, these efforts do not directly create safe and secure environments for the people. 
Population and resources control are the most essential to providing civil security which 
is the most important thing for the government to acquire in order to win an insurgency 
war.  
The Thai government already applies both direct and indirect approaches to cope 
with the southern insurgency but has not achieved a satisfactory outcome. Even though 
the interim government, led by (retired) Gen. Surayud Chulanont, changed its strategy to 
one of conciliation, dissolving the black list, improving legitimacy, and reviving the 
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SBPAC (Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre) and CPM-43 (43rd joint 
Civilian-Police-Military Command), the insurgency situation still continues. The security 
of the people and officials is still at risk. This indicates that there must be a flaw or 
weakness in the implementations. The government has failed to identify the insurgents 
and failed to protect the people. The government has failed to annihilate the insurgents 
because there has been insufficient intelligence about the insurgents.  
While the government conducts psychological operations, civil affairs, and 
improves the living conditions of the population in order to obtain mass support, at the 
same time, the government must establish civil security and sever the links between the 
insurgents and the people. Once the people are secure, other measures can be continued. 
Lessons learned from the counterinsurgency models of the Diamond Model, COIN 
Military Components, the Basilan Model, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, and the 
Malayan Emergency are definitely essential to helping the Thai government improve its 
population and resources control.  
The Malayan Emergency and the Basilan Model did prove that if the government 
is able to separate the insurgents from their popular base, and is able to provide civil 
security, the government will conquer the insurgents. There is a need to place strict PRC 
measures in an area of active support of the insurgency. There is a need to increase 
patrolling and surveillance to limit the freedom of the insurgents. There is a need to 
establish secure areas and expand them to the last village. 
  In approaching the people, the officials must break down obstacles that have been 
creating blocks between the people and the officials. If the officials are able to dissolve 
these obstacles—distrust; perceived low-legitimate operations; injustice; coercion by the 
insurgents; and new insurgent recruits; as well as language, cultural and religious 
differences—and operate with a perceived high-legitimacy, dissolve the insurgents’ 
coercion (by improved PRC measures), cease new recruiting, enhance justice, and 
improve cultural awareness; trust will be restored the people. The government will obtain 
“consensus” and finally “control” the people. 
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Weak points of the military in PRC implementation must be corrected and 
improved as soon as possible. Routine change and insufficiency of the constabulary force 
seems to be an important problem apart from inaccurate assessment, laxness at 
checkpoints, infiltration of the insurgents into village defense volunteer forces, and 
problems in providing a secure environment in rural areas. Without a dedicated and 
skilled constabulary force and its components, the government will be unable to turn 
“red” villages into “green.” Without creating “green” villages, the government will fight 
this war without victory. 
In its history, the Thai government has had little comprehension of Islam, and all 
legislation has originated from the central Buddhist government. Many rules and laws 
were based on Buddhist law, not Islamic law. Government officials who worked in the 
south were, in the majority, Buddhist, and did not understand Muslim customs and 
culture. The government in Bangkok did not pay serious attention to petitions from 
Muslims in the south. The head of the government usually came from the military, 
sometimes the autocracy, and was hard-handed when dealing with the southern problem. 
All of these issues together created grievances which are the root cause of the insurgency.  
The revival of the insurgency today not only stems from the perpetual ideology of 
secession, but also is added to by the global trend of jihad and abusive government 
officials. Moreover, the wrong handling of the government initially caused an escalation 
of the situation. After almost twenty years of peace and an absence of any insurgency 
problem in the southern border and all other regions in Thailand, the government and the 
new generation of the military now are having a difficult time dealing with the 
insurgency. The reinstallation of a secure environment in the three southernmost 
provinces is the key to ending this situation of unrest. 
Thus, even if the government is able to conquer the 2000s insurgency, a long term 
plan and implementation to sustain the peace and prosperity in the southernmost 
provinces must be provided. The long term plan might be a good thesis topic for other 
scholars who are interested in the southern Thailand insurgency.  
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